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Abstract
Climate change is complex during the best of times. It is
commonly conceptualized as the quintessential global collective
action problem: it affects those who do not contribute to it while
the benefits of climate change mitigation measures are not
restricted to those who pursue such measures.
This
conceptualization illustrates the high transaction costs involved
in domestic policies as well as in international agreements
addressing climate change, and it is of academic and practical
interest. As such, this Article discusses the current challenges
that climate change policies face, focusing on the linkages
between the climate change policies of the Trump administration
and the COVID-19 pandemic and on the effects of those linkages,
both in the United States and globally. Specifically, this Article
addresses the Trump administration’s attacks on climate science
and its deregulatory climate agenda, as well as the United States’
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. In
addition, it discusses principles of international law and the
challenges related to state liability for environmental harms in
the context of the COVID-19 crisis. This Article also assesses how
the United States’ climate policies are likely to aggravate
inequalities both domestically, as well as globally, in the
aftermath of the pandemic.
This Article offers several original contributions. First, it
provides a unique assessment of how the deregulatory climate
policies implemented nationally and internationally by the
Trump administration have magnified the COVID-19 crisis.
Second, the law and economics methodology used in this Article
validates the claim that improving environmental quality is
connected to optimizing early regulatory action. Third, this
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Article discusses the challenges of state liability for climate
harms in the aftermath of the United States’ withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement and concurrent COVID-19 pandemic.
Finally, this Article offers relevant insights for the literature on
climate change that are likely to be applicable to critical future
situations, whether they are health-related, a global economic
crisis, or climate-related emergencies.
Ultimately, this Article concludes that, in the aggregate, all
such climate change policies have contributed to increased
pollution, including elevated greenhouse gas emissions that have
aggravated pre-pandemic inequalities embedded within the
United States and among countries. Consequently, the domestic
and international policy choices of the Trump administration are
worsening the impact of the pandemic, particularly for those in
more vulnerable positions, as well as indelibly poisoning the
global commons.
Keywords: climate change, climate policy, international
environmental law, international law, international energy law,
COVID-19, pandemic, deregulation, Trump administration,
Paris Agreement, international liability, climate harm,
inequality.
I.

INTRODUCTION

Climate change is complex during the best of times. It is
commonly conceptualized as the quintessential global collective
action problem 1: it affects those who do not contribute to it while
the benefits of climate change mitigation measures are not
This
restricted to those who pursue such measures. 2
conceptualization illustrates the high transaction costs involved
in domestic policies, as well as in international agreements
addressing climate change, and it is of academic and practical
1. Daniel C. Esty & Anthony L. I. Moffa, Why Climate Change Collective
Action Has Failed and What Needs to be Done Within and Without the Trade
Regime, 15 J. INT’L ECON. L. 777 (2012). Pollution, after all, is the paradigmatic
example of the tragedy of the commons. See also Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy
of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1245 (1968) (“The rational man finds that his
share of the cost of the wastes he discharges into the commons is less than the
cost of purifying his wastes before releasing them. Since this is true for
everyone, we are locked into a system of ‘fouling our own nest,’ so long as we
behave only as independent, rational, free-enterprises.”).
2. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, DEALING WITH LOSERS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF POLICY TRANSITION 120 (2014).
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interest. As such, this Article discusses the current challenges
that climate change policies face, focusing on the linkages
between the climate change policies of the Trump
administration and the COVID-19 pandemic, and on the effects
of those linkages, both in the United States and globally. 3
Specifically, this Article addresses the Trump administration’s
attacks on climate science and its deregulatory climate agenda,
as well as the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement. This Article concludes that, in the aggregate, all
these climate change policies have contributed to increased
pollution, including elevated greenhouse gas (“GHG”) emissions
that have intensified pre-pandemic inequalities embedded
within the United States and among other countries.
Consequently, the domestic and international policy choices of
the Trump administration are worsening the impact of the
pandemic, particularly for those in more vulnerable positions, as
well as indelibly poisoning the global commons.
Despite the complexity of climate change, the scientific
knowledge outlining broad principles on the topic is
uncontested. 4 Of course this does not, as in any scientific
endeavor, abolish all uncertainty. 5 This uncertainty is further
heightened by novelty; the changes that will potentially be
caused by climate change have few precedents in the history of
the Earth. 6 Accordingly, predictions are perennially affected by
uncertainty, speculation, and lack of information regarding
future GHG emissions, the effects of past and future emissions
on the climate system, the impact of changes in climate on the
physical and biological environment, and how such
environmental effects might translate into economic damage. 7
3. The World Health Organization officially declared COVID-19 a
pandemic on March 11, 2020. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, Dir-Gen., WHO
Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19,
HEALTH
ORG.
(Mar.
11,
2020),
WORLD
https://www.who.int/dg/speeches/detail/who-director-general-s-openingremarks-at-the-media-briefing-on-covid-19---11-march-2020.
4. See Antony Millner et al., Ambiguity and Climate Policy 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper No. 16050, 2010) (highlighting that
empirical predictions based on sophisticated models may lead to different
forecasts).
5. See generally ANDREW DESSLER & EDWARD A. PARSON, THE SCIENCE AND
POLITICS OF GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: A GUIDE TO THE DEBATE 1 (2d ed., 2010).
6. Id. at 2.
7. INTERAGENCY WORKING GRP. ON SOC. COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES,
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Despite potential uncertainties about the precise time-frame
and costs involved, the impacts of climate change are estimated
to be severe. 8 These estimations include both market damages
(e.g., infrastructure, tourism, increased energy demand, among
others) and non-market damages (such as the impact on ecology
and cultural values, for instance). 9
In such a context, climate change presents unique
challenges for domestic and international regulation, as it refers
primarily to future events, 10 with consequences that require
policy coordination and multi-level governance (specifically, at
Three main factors
national and international levels). 11
contribute to the complexity of climate policies. First, human
behavior discounts the value of long-term challenges in favor of
present gains. 12 Second, the majority of countries in the
developed world are democracies based on electoral cycles that
tend to reward short-term considerations. 13 Third, regulatory
efforts face additional hurdles because the connection between
the risks of climate change (storms, rising sea levels, fires,
floods) and climate change itself is not immediate to the public. 14
Therefore, transaction costs for the involved parties are very
high, despite the immediate need to enact climate change
TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF
CARBON FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866, 3
(2016). See generally O. Hoegh-Guldberg et al., The Human Imperative of
Stabilizing Global Climate Change at 1.5°C, 365 SCI. 1 (2019) (contending the
immediate need for meaningful climate change policies, as the synergistic
nature of climate threats has not been fully assessed and the outcomes are
likely to be worse than the sum of the parts).
8. See ERIC A. POSNER & ALAN O. SYKES, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 230 (2013).
9. Charles Kolstad et al., Social, Economic, and Ethical Concepts and
Methods, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: MITIGATION OF CLIMATE CHANGE 212
(Edenhofer et al eds., 2014).
10. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 2 (2011).
11. Esty & Moffa, supra note 1, at 777.
12. See GIDDENS, supra note 10, at 3 (explaining future discounting,
namely, the idea that humans prefer a small present reward instead of a future
large reward). See generally Peter C. Fishburn & Ariel Rubinstein, Time
Preference, 23 INT’L ECON. REV. 677 (1982) (on present bias and discounting
rate).
13. See generally GIDDENS, supra note 10, at 2−6.
14. See Cary Coglianese, Climate Change Necessitates Normative Change,
REV.
(Jan.
27,
2020),
REGUL.
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/01/27/coglianese-climate-changenecessitates-normative-change/.
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regulation both domestically and under international treaties. 15
Having established the importance of climate regulation in
the national and global spheres, 16 this Article investigates the
linkages between the deregulatory climate agenda pursued by
the Trump administration 17 and the COVID-19 pandemic in
both spheres. Starting with the national perspective, this
Article discusses particular deregulatory actions either
implemented or proposed by the Trump administration that are
likely to adversely impact the pandemic and the current climate
crisis. The selected policies are the most likely to have
significant consequences for these emergencies. Pollution in
general, including GHGs, adversely impacts one’s immunity and
respiratory systems, making individuals more vulnerable to the
COVID-19 virus. 18 Hence, attacks on climate science and the
following proposed deregulatory policies are examined: directing
agencies to neglect GHG emissions and the related grant of
license that authorizes construction of pipelines coupled with
undue delays in issuing energy regulations, the repeal of the
Clean Air Act, the repeal of the Clean Power Plan and related
threats to air quality, the flexibilization of the National
Environmental Policy Act, the rollback of regulations promoting
fuel efficiency, and the relaxation of regulatory standards and
overall enforcement during the COVID-19 pandemic.
As for the international sphere, this Article focuses on how
the Trump administration has undermined global cooperation
15. See Charles F. Sabel & David G. Victor, Governing Global Problems
Under Uncertainty: Making Bottom-Up Climate Policy Work, 144 CLIMATIC
CHANGE 15, 18 (2017).
16. The need for academic investigation of the Trump administration’s
climate policies in both spheres is also motivated by the Trump administration
deregulatory agenda. After all, President Trump has demonstrated “little
enthusiasm either for environmental enforcement or for minority
communities.” See generally Michael B. Gerrard, Emergency Exemptions from
Environmental Laws, in LAW IN THE TIME OF COVID-19 88 (Katharina Pistor
ed., 2020).
17. Jessica Wentz & Michael B. Gerrard, Persistent Regulations: A
Detailed Assessment of the Trump Administration’s Efforts to Repeal Federal
L.
SCH.
1,
1
(2019),
Climate
Protections,
COLUM.
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-3dcs-3h21.
18. See Jason A. Schwartz, Weakening Our Defenses: How the Trump
Administration’s Deregulatory Push Has Exacerbated the COVID-19
Pandemic, N.Y.U. INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY 1, 4 (2020) (https://policy
integrity.org/publications/detail/weakening-our-defenses (see also medical
references therein).
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on climate matters. The reduction of carbon emissions and
GHGs are at the core of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”) 19 and its corollary,
the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. 20 Both treaties were
informed by the best-available scientific knowledge. 21 Scientific
consensus correlates climate change with global warming, of
which one human-induced cause is the accumulation of GHGs in
the atmosphere. 22 Ignoring the severe risks and costs associated
with the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
on Climate Change, 23 the Trump administration decided to
19. See United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art.
23, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC
entered into force on March 21, 1994. The scientific consensus regarding the
existence of climate change and the necessity of mitigation were paramount
considerations during UNFCCC negotiations. John Houghton, Science and
International Environmental Policy: The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, THE ECONOMY, AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: THE UNITED STATES, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 355–57 (Richard Revesz et al. eds., 2000).
20. United Nations Paris Agreement art. 2, Dec. 12, 2015, 54113 U.N.T.S.
88 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]. The Paris Agreement, with its goal of
reducing GHGs, was negotiated following the legal framework of the UNFCCC,
a treaty with 196 state parties to which the Senate gave its advice and consent
in 1992. See also HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 39 (2018).
21. See María Pía Carazo, Contextual Provisions: Preamble and Article 1,
in THE PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY
109–10 (Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017).
22. The scientific community overwhelmingly acknowledges the existence
of climate change and that GHG emissions are a primary cause. See Richard
S.J. Tol, Quantifying the Consensus on Anthropogenic Global Warming in the
Literature: A Re-Analysis, 73 ENERGY POL’Y 701 (2014); see also Richard S.J.
Tol, The Elusive Consensus on Climate Change 8 (U. Sussex Bus. Sch., Working
Paper No. 03-2019, 2019) (emphasizing that 97% of scientific studies point to
human activity as “the most important factor in climate change since 1950”).
The EPA, for instance, acknowledges that the combustion of fossil fuels is
likely the human activity that contributes most to the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. See Carbon Dioxide Emissions, EPA (last updated
Sept. 8, 2020), https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/overview-greenhousegases#carbon-dioxide.
23. The costs involved are significant. A recent study on heat-related
mortality avoided by lowering current emissions in line with the Paris
Agreement found that, with a high degree of confidence and using conservative
estimations, the United States would avoid from 70 to 1,980 annual heatrelated deaths. See Y.T. Eunice Lo et al., Increasing Mitigation Ambition to
Meet the Paris Agreement’s Temperature Goal Avoids Substantial Heat-Related
Mortality in U.S. Cities, 5 SCI. ADVANCES 1, 4 (2019). According to the EPA,
natural disasters in 2017 caused $306.2 billion in cumulative damages, making
the year the most expensive on record. The report also emphasized that
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formalize that withdrawal. 24 This will lead to increasing GHG
emissions and overall pollution, 25 thus negatively impacting the
mitigating effects of the pandemic.
Aggravating this scenario, the negative environmental
effects of the pandemic will be dire, which is contrary to common
assumptions. The International Energy Agency (“IEA”) warns
that, unless investments are made in cleaner and more resilient
energy infrastructure, total emissions may rebound (as they
have done after previous economic crashes) to levels higher than
before the crisis. 26 Corroborating such warnings, a new review
of the empirical literature concluded that, despite the temporary
reduction of global carbon emissions due to the pandemic, 27
benefits for the planet will not be as hoped. 28 Another study
found that the immediate climate effects of the pandemic-related
restrictions are close to negligible, and lasting effects, if any, will
be dependent upon the recovery strategy that is adopted in the
medium term. 29 As carbon dioxide emissions are expected to
climate change is expected to increase the frequency and intensity of such
events. See ENV’T PROT. AGENCY, EPA 530-F-19-003, PLANNING FOR NATURAL
DISASTER DEBRIS (2019).
24. The United States served notice of the withdrawal on the first date
possible under the Paris Agreement. See Lisa Friedman, Trump Serves Notice
to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-paris-agreementclimate.html. The U.S. withdrawal will likely take effect on Nov. 4, 2020. See
also Paris Agreement, supra note 20, at 28 (outlining the withdrawal
mechanism).
25. See Lo et al., supra note 23, at 6.
26. See generally Global Energy Review: 2020, INT’L ENERGY AGENCY (Apr.
2020), https://www.iea.org/reports/global-energy-review-2020.
27. See Corinne Le Quéré et al., Temporary Reduction in Daily Global CO2
Emissions During the COVID-19 Forced Confinement, 10 NATURE CLIMATE
CHANGE 647, 652 (2020) (contending that any changes in carbon dioxide
emissions are likely temporary because social changes alone, without benefits
to wellbeing and supporting infrastructure, will not lead to the deep and
sustained reductions needed to achieve net zero emissions).
28. See Andrew Hook et al., A Systematic Review of the Energy and
Climate Impacts of Teleworking, 15 ENV’T RSCH. LETTERS 1, 2–5 (2020)
(explaining that there is much uncertainty about potential savings of
teleworking; factors considered are an increase in home energy use and more
travels due to the absence of a commute).
29. See Piers M. Forster et al., Current and Future Global Climate
Impacts Resulting from COVID-19, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 913, 918
(2020) (highlighting that without long-term system-wide decarbonization of
economies, even globally significant shifts in behavior are insufficient to
achieve anything but modest reductions).
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quickly rebound, 30 the benefits accrued during the pandemic are
expected to be superseded by retaliatory pollution. 31 Moreover,
the decline in green energy investments that has been provoked
by the pandemic may also contribute to a spike in carbon
Pandemic-related cleaning and disinfecting
emissions. 32
activities are also expected to have negative environmental
impacts. 33
In light of the above, this Article offers several original
contributions. First, it provides a unique assessment of how the
deregulatory climate policies implemented nationally and
internationally by the Trump administration have magnified
the COVID-19 crisis. Second, the law and economic methodology
used in this Article, as applied to the linkages between climate
change and the pandemic, validates the claim that improving
environmental quality is connected to optimizing early
regulatory action. 34 Third, this Article discusses the challenges
of state liability for climate harms in the aftermath of the United
States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement and concurrent
COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, this Article offers relevant
insights for the literature on climate change that are likely to be
applicable to critical future situations, whether they are healthrelated, a global economic crisis, 35 or climate-related

30. See Le Quéré et al., supra note 27, at 652.
31. See Brad Plumer et al., The Coronavirus and Carbon Emissions, N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/26/climate/nytclimate-newsletter-coronavirus.html (noting that in China, previous
experience shows that industries have tried to ramp up production to make up
for lost output or temporary shutdown, a practice called “retaliatory pollution”
by Li Shuo, senior advisor of Greenpeace Asia).
32. See Kevin Dennehy, Decline in Green Energy Spending Might Offset
COVID-Era Emissions Benefits, YALE SCH. ENV’T (June 22, 2020),
https://environment.yale.edu/news/article/drop-in-green-energy-investmentscould-outweigh-silverlining-benefits-of-pandemic.
33. See Manfred Lenzen et al., Global Socio-Economic Losses and
Environmental Gains From the Coronavirus Pandemic, 15(7) PLOS ONE 1, 5
(2020).
34. See Michael A. Livermore et al., Global Cost-Benefit Analysis, in THE
GLOBALIZATION OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS IN ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 5
(Michael A. Livermore & Richard L. Revesz eds., 2013).
35. See COVID-19: An Unprecedented Global Health and Economic Crisis,
INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, https://www.iea.org/topics/covid-19 (last visited Jan. 19,
2021) (contending that, because of the pandemic, global oil and gas markets
were facing the unprecedented situation of collapsing demand and an already
abundant supply that continues to increase).
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emergencies. 36
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II focuses on the
domestic sphere, analyzing the climate deregulation measures
that will likely have an adverse impact on the COVID-19 crisis.
Part III analyzes a major deregulatory action that will
negatively impact the pandemic: the withdrawal of the United
States from the Paris Agreement. It also examines principles of
international law and the challenges related to state liability for
environmental harms in the context of the COVID-19 crisis.
Part IV discusses how the United States’ climate policies are
likely to aggravate inequalities, both domestic and global, in the
aftermath of the pandemic. It examines how these inequalities
are similar and then highlights that those who are bearing the
major consequences of COVID-19 have already been facing the
adverse impacts of climate change. Part V concludes that
President Trump’s climate policies are not maximizing the
wellbeing of the U.S. population and have exacerbated the
impact of the pandemic domestically as well as globally.
Accordingly, the United States needs an approach to climate
change policies that is coherent on both the national and global
stages.
Ultimately, these policies need to reconcile the
maximization of wellbeing and equity, leading to a paradigmatic
change; instead of poisoning of the commons, the country will be
part of the cure.
II.

WORSENING THE COVID-19 CRISIS: AN OVERVIEW OF THE
TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S ATTACKS ON CLIMATE SCIENCE
AND DEREGULATORY CLIMATE POLICIES

The deregulatory policies discussed in this Part, whether
proposed or implemented, are those most likely to have
significantly adverse consequences for the COVID-19 pandemic
and current climate crisis. There is growing consensus that
cardiovascular and respiratory diseases, cancer, diabetes,
asthma, obesity, and chronic neurological disorders, including
36. See Owen Jones, Why Don’t We Treat the Climate Crisis with the Same
Urgency as Coronavirus?,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 5, 2020, 6:52 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2020/mar/05/governmentscoronavirus-urgent-climate-crisis (“While coronavirus is understandably
treated as an imminent danger, the climate crisis is still presented as an
abstraction whose consequences are decades away. Unlike an illness, it is
harder to visualize how climate breakdown will affect us each as individuals.”).
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dementia, are aggravating factors for COVID-19. 37 Pollution
(whether particulate matter, chemical, GHG, or air pollution)
increases the likelihood of those diseases, aggravates their
symptoms, and expands individual vulnerability to the COVID19 virus. 38
Part II, in addition to discussing attacks on climate science
by the Trump administration, examines the following proposed
deregulatory policies: (i) the direction to agencies to neglect both
GHG emissions and the related grant of license that authorizes
construction of pipelines, as well as undue delay of regulation
issuance, (ii) the repeal of the Clean Air Act, (iii) the repeal of
the Clean Power Plan and related threats to air quality, (iv) the
flexibilization of the National Environmental Policy Act, (v) the
rollback of regulations promoting fuel efficiency, and (vi) the
flexibilization of regulatory standards and overall enforcement
during the COVID-19 pandemic. This Part also addresses the
use of flawed scientific evidence, as well as the tempering of costbenefit analysis involved in such major deregulatory climate
policies.
This Part is premised on the use of cost-benefit analysis to
improve the environment and individual health. 39 Cost-benefit
analysis aims at the maximization of overall well-being, 40 and it
assumes that rational administrative agencies should work to
maximize such wellbeing. 41 This Part further assumes that the
actual consideration of costs and benefits is indicative of a
reasoned administrative action, i.e., one that is justified rather
than arbitrary. 42 Reasoned decision-making, after all, is a
37. See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 4−6.
38. See id.
39. This research assumes that, for governments to make good decisions,
they must avoid “gut-level decision making” and should not abandon reasoned
analysis.
RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING
RATIONALITY: HOW COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS CAN BETTER PROTECT THE
ENVIRONMENT AND OUR HEALTH 3 (2008).
40. “Cost-benefit analysis is best defended as a welfarist decision
procedure. Cost-benefit analysis is justified as a decision procedure to the
extent that it advances overall wellbeing—that is, the wellbeing of the public
generally, if not necessarily every member of the public—relative to alternative
decision procedures, including the null case of doing nothing.” MATTHEW D.
ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS 6
(2006). “Public,” for the purposes of this article, is the U.S. general population.
41. See id. at 25.
42. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 743, 749–53 (2015) (determining that
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requisite for any administrative action under the
Therefore,
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). 43
deregulation, which involves removing existing regulations in a
particular market, needs to be reasoned: where regulatory
norms exist, the administration is required to justify their
revocation. 44 Adding interest to the current investigation is the
fact that, despite administrative deference, the Trump
administration’s success rate is approximately 9%, which is
significantly lower than the 66% average. 45
Having established such premises, this Part turns now to
the deregulatory climate policies of the Trump administration 46
that are most likely to significantly aggravate the COVID-19
pandemic.

consideration of costs is mandatory for executive agencies); see also CASS R.
SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION 3 (2018) (discussing the rise of the
cost-benefit state and the trend of judicial decisions requiring cost
considerations as indicative of non-arbitrariness); Daniele Bertolini &
Carolina Arlota, Why Michigan v. EPA Requires that the Meaning of the
Cost/Rationality Nexus Be Clarified, 29 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 125, 155 (2017)
(arguing, inter alia, that the United States Supreme Court neglected to
consider cost as a relational concept).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (mandating courts to invalidate actions found to
be “arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with the law”).
44. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Chevronizing Around CostBenefit Analysis, 70 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 3–4) (noting
that the Obama-era regulations that President Trump aims to repeal were
based on plausible cost-benefit analysis whereas the Trump administration’s
deregulatory initiatives actually fail cost-benefit analysis).
45. Roundup: Trump-Era Agency Policy in the Courts, N.Y.U INST. POL’Y
INTERGITY, https://policyintegrity.org/deregulation-roundup (last visited Mar.
1, 2021) (regarding agency cases that involve proposed rollbacks). According
to the Roundup, the administration won eight cases while losing seventy-eight.
Thus, this Article infers that the success rate of the Trump administration is
9.3% as of June 2020. Kimberly Strawbridge Robinson, High Court Rulings
Highlight Trump’s Administrative Law Stumbles, BLOOMBERG NEWS (June 19,
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-law-week/high-court-rulings2020),
highlight-trumps-administrative-law-stumbles (citing the 70% success rate of
previous administrations, on average). See generally David Zaring, Reasonable
Agencies, 96 VA. L. REV. 135, 177−84 (2010) (arguing that, regardless of the
standard of review, courts in the United States are likely to affirm agencies’
actions more than two-thirds of the time).
46. Some of the arguments advanced in section A of Part II appear in a
previous work. Carolina Arlota, How President Trump’s War on Science
Undermines Cost-Benefit Analysis of Climate Policies, 50 ELR 10999 (2020).
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A. President Trump’s War on Climate Science
Early in Trump’s term in office, renowned scientists
censured the administration, claiming that science and objective
truth had never been more strained. 47 Attacks on science,
however, are not recent or unique to the United States 48 nor to
this administration. 49 Despite global attacks, 50 experts have
called the Trump administration’s disregard for scientific
Top governmental
knowledge “worse than . . . ever.” 51
administrative positions, including those in the EPA, are
occupied by former lobbyists with intimate financial connections
to the agencies they are responsible for overseeing. 52 Studies
comparing Trump’s administration and previous presidencies
have also found evidence of unprecedented behavior, including
President Trump’s disregard for the findings of the government’s
own scientists. 53 During this administration, the attacks on
climate science and related censorship of scientists at the federal
level became common and further spread to the state level, with
initiatives eventually replicating such actions at all levels of
47. See Jonathan Foley, The War on Facts Is a War on Democracy, SCI.
AM. BLOG NETWORK (Jan. 25, 2017), https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/guestblog/the-war-on-facts-is-a-war-on-democracy/.
48. See THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE:
HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH, 128–79 (2008)
(drawing on public record to describe systematic actions to discredit scientists
and their research and examining how scientists have been mistreated).
49. Brad Plumer & Coral Davenport, Science Under Attack: How Trump
Is Sidelining Researchers and Their Work, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/28/climate/trump-administration-war-onscience.html (noting that, though previous administrations have disregarded
scientific evidence to varying degrees, the scope of such disregard under
President Trump is much wider).
50. Riley E. Dunlap & Aaron M. McCright, Organized Climate Change
Denial, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CLIMATE CHANGE AND SOCIETY 144–45
(John S. Dryzek et al. eds., 2011) (detailing global attacks on science and
finding that when “[v]iewed through a broader theoretical lens, climate change
denial can be seen as part of a more sweeping effort to defend the modern
Western social order, which has been built by an industrial capitalism powered
by fossil fuels”).
51. The quotes are from Professor Michael Gerrard, who stated, “[t]he
disregard for expertise in the federal government is worse than it’s ever been.”
Plumer & Davenport, supra note 49.
52. See id.
53. Emily Berman & Jacob Carter, Policy Analysis: Scientific Integrity in
Federal Policymaking Under Past and Present Administrations, 13 J. SCI.
POL’Y & GOVERNANCE 1, 2 (2018).
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government. 54
Examples of particular administrative actions that
undermine climate science are abound. 55 Attempts to remove
scientific evidence on climate change from the EPA’s web page
were among the first steps taken by the Trump administration. 56
In addition, the administration altered the parameters of
estimations made by the United States Geological Survey office,
eliminating the projected effects of increased carbon dioxide
pollution after 2040. 57 Further examples of administrative
fettering of science include the removal of worst-case scenario
projections from the National Climate Assessment, an
interagency report produced every four years, 58 and attacks on
climate science within the EPA’s proposed new rule on science, 59

54. See, e.g., Sabin Center for Climate Change Law & the Legal Defense
Fund,
Silencing
Science
Tracker,
COLUM.
L.
SCH.,
https://climate.law.columbia.edu/Silencing-Science-Tracker (last visited Mar.
1, 2021) (displaying, since November 2016, a comprehensive list of actions
which may adversely impact science, including measures from federal, state,
and local governments as well as their agencies).
55. Arlota, supra note 46 (discussing the war on science and how
President Trump’s attacks undermine cost-benefit analysis).
56. Valerie Volcovici, Trump Administration Tells EPA to Cut Climate
Page from Website: Sources, REUTERS (Jan. 25, 2017, 10:54 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-epa-climatechange/trumpadministration-tells-epa-to-cut-climate-page-from-website-sourcesidUSKBN15906G.
57. The Trump administration likely chose to do so due to the effects of
global warming becoming particularly severe after 2050. See Coral Davenport
& Mark Landler, Trump Administration Hardens Its Attack on Climate
TIMES
(May
27,
2019),
Science,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/27/us/politics/trump-climate-science.html.
58. Philip B. Duffy (the then-president of the Woods Hole Research Center
who served on a National Academy of Sciences panel that reviewed the
government’s most recent National Climate Assessment) stated: “What we
have here is a pretty blatant attempt to politicize the science—to push the
science in a direction that’s consistent with their politics . . . It reminds me of
the Soviet Union.” Id.
59. For the original proposed rule, see ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
AGENCY: SCIENCE ADVISOR PROGRAMS, STRENGTHENING TRANSPARENCY IN
REGULATORY
SCIENCE
PROPOSAL
(Mar.
20,
2018),
https://www.epa.gov/osa/strengthening-transparency-regulatory-science.
More recently, an editorial by one of the most prestigious scientific publications
called the updated rule’s supposed ability to increase transparency misleading
and strongly criticized it. Editorial, The Sustained Undermining of Science by
the EPA’s Leaders Is a Travesty, NATURE (May 5, 2020),
https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-020-01310-y.
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which was overwhelmingly opposed by scientific groups. 60 Legal
experts also vocally opposed these developments: 100
environmental and administrative law professors signed a letter
urging the EPA to withdraw this revisited rule, as it does not
foster science. 61
B. Direction of Agencies to Neglect GHG Emissions, Licensing
of Pipelines, and Undue Delay of Regulation Issuance
President Trump directed agencies to review (modify,
suspend, or rescind) regulations that may “unduly burden”
energy development—including those aimed at reducing GHG
Likewise, President Trump made previous
emissions. 62
standards concerning the grant of licenses for pipelines and
then-existing state powers in the Clean Water Act much more
flexible. 63 In addition, President Trump reversed previous
decisions by President Obama and ultimately authorized the
Dakota Access and Keystone XL oil pipelines. 64 Litigation
ensued and is still ongoing. 65 Recently, the Dakota Access
60. Lisa Friedman, Coronavirus Doesn’t Slow Trump’s Regulatory
Rollbacks,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
25,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/25/climate/coronavirus-environmentalregulations-trump.html.
61. Emmett Inst. on Climate Change & the Env., Comment on
Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (“SNPRM”)—Strengthening
Transparency in Regulatory Science: 85 Fed. Reg. 15396, 1−2 (May 18, 2020),
https://legal-planet.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Law-Profs-EPA-HQ-OA2018-0259-Comment-FINAL-5-17-20.pdf (arguing that the EPA lacks the
authority to issue such a rule and that the proposal “bears no relationship to
widely-accepted principle and procedures of scientific review”); see Climate
Science Legal Defense Fund & Sabin Center for Climate Change Law,
Comments on the Supplemental Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding
EPA’s Proposed Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory Science Rule
(Docket
ID
No.
EPA-HQ-OA-2018-0259)
(May
18,
2020),
https://climate.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/content/CSLDF%20Sabin
%20Comments%20on%20EPA%20Science%20Transparency%20Rule.pdf.
62. Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,093 (Mar. 31, 2017).
63. Exec. Order No. 13868, 84 Fed. Reg. 15,495 (Apr. 10, 2019).
64. Cat Schuknecht, Trump Signs Executive Orders in Push to Make It
Easier to Build Oil and Gas Pipelines, NPR (Apr. 11, 2019, 9:48 AM),
https://www.npr.org/2019/04/11/712121425/trump-signs-executive-orders-inpush-to-make-it-easier-to-build-oil-and-gas-pipe.
65. See, e.g., N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 2035412, 2020 U.S. App. LEXIS 16987, at *4 (9th Cir. May 28, 2020) (denying
the federal administration’s request to stay a previous decision revoking
essential construction permits on wetlands and other bodies of water).
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Pipeline has been shut down by a district court, a decision that
was motivated by a finding of insufficient environmental review
(technically, an environmental impact statement—“EIS”); 66 on
the same day, the Supreme Court of the United States denied
the Trump administration and ET Energy authorization to
pursue the construction of the Keystone XL pipeline despite the
pending legal cases that involve it. 67
These rulings show how hasty administrative decisions can
be costly, both in the realm of carbon emissions and in that of
litigation. Market forces, due to the costs of litigation and
uncertainty, responded unfavorably to the President’s “drill,
baby, drill” approach, 68 and developers gave up building the
Atlantic Coast Pipeline for good. 69 In spite of such reactions, the
combination of the two executive orders shows that the
President is directing agencies to focus on potential immediate
economic benefits as opposed to giving weight to long-term
considerations regarding the economy, health, and the
environment.
These executive orders are likely to be
detrimental to health and the environment across the country
and will contribute to a significant increase in GHG emissions.
These emissions, in turn, will aggravate the current climate and
COVID-19 crises.
Likewise, the delay of additional regulations by the Trump
administration’s Department of Energy has contributed to an
increase in GHG emissions from power plants, as well as an
elevated output of mercury and other harmful pollutants. 70 The
66. See Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 471 F.
Supp. 3d 71, 76–77 (D.D.C. July 6, 2020). The decision is available at:
https://earthjustice.org/sites/default/files/files/standing_rock_sioux_tribe_v._a
rmy_corps_of_engineers.pdf. Interestingly, Judge Boasberg weighed economic
costs of the decision in light of the environmental concerns, concluding that the
merely economic considerations presented by the U.S Corps of Engineers and
Dakota Access were not sufficient to outweigh these concerns. Id. at 18–24.
67. See U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs v. N. Plains Res. Council, No. 19A1053,
2020 U.S. LEXIS 3545, at *1 (U.S. July 6, 2020) (order granting partial vacatur
and an injunction).
68. The expression was coined at the 2008 Republican National
Convention in St. Paul, Minn. by Michael Steele, the former lieutenant
governor of Maryland. Josh Kurtz, “Drill, baby, drill!” Almost Didn’t Happen,
E&E NEWS (Aug. 29, 2012), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1059969331.
69. Kevin Dietsch, Developers Abandon the Atlantic Coast Pipeline for
Good, NRDC (July 6, 2020), https://www.nrdc.org/experts/nrdc/developersabandon-atlantic-coast-pipeline-good.
70. Schwartz, supra note 18, at 10−11 (highlighting that the DOE, under
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policies, had they not been delayed, could have ameliorated
these environmental conditions and saved energy instead of
ultimately contributing to the COVID-19 health crisis.
C. The New Legal Framework of the Clean Air Act
There are significant flaws in the cost-benefit analysis 71 of
the new rule addressing the scope of waters federally regulated
under the Clean Air Act. 72 Among the methodological flaws, the
EPA and the Army Corps of Engineers unreasonably fail to
estimate the majority of the proposed rule’s social harms while
grossly undervaluing the few harms listed. 73 The refusal of the
EPA to enact stricter standards for national ambient quality,
despite the recommendations of its own scientists, 74 neglects the
findings of recent scientific studies on the importance of air

President Trump, failed to take actions on several energy efficient standards
for consumer and commercial appliances and reversed course on light bulb
standards, among others. Similar actions happened at the Department of
Transportation and Occupational exposures.).
71. Derrick Z. Jackson, The EPA’s Dirty Water: New Rule Discards
Science, Ignores Importance of Wetlands and Tributaries, UNION OF
CONCERNED
SCIENTISTS
(Apr.
25,
2020,
10:00
AM),
https://blog.ucsusa.org/derrick-jackson/the-epas-dirty-water-new-rulediscards-science-ignores-importance-of-wetlands-and-tributaries
(highlighting that all the major scientific societies and the administration’s
own Science Advisory Board warned the EPA that the agency did not
incorporate the “best available science” on Navigable Waters).
72. The Navigable Waters Protection Rule: Definition of “Waters of the
United States,” 85 Fed. Reg. 22,250 (Apr. 21, 2020) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R.
pt. 328 and 40 C.F.R. pts. 110, 112, 116, 117, 120, 122, 230, 232, 300, 302, 401).
73. Bethany A. Davis Noll et al., Beneath the Surface: The Concealed Costs
of the Clean Water Rule Rollback, N.Y.U. INST. POL’Y INTEGRITY 6−18 (Apr.
2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/publications/Clean_Water_Rule_Policy_Report
.pdf.
74. EPA’S OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS (OAQPS),
POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR QUALITY
STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/201909/documents/draft_policy_assessment_for_pm_ naaqs_09-05-2019.pdf (“[A]
conclusion that the current primary PM2.5 standards do provide adequate
public health protection would place little weight on the broad body of
epidemiologic evidence reporting generally positive and statistically
significant health effect associations, particularly for PM2.5 air quality
distributions likely to have been allowed by the current primary standards. . .
.”); id. at 3–98.
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quality to health outcomes during the COVID-19 pandemic. 75
Under the Clean Air Act, 76 the EPA must review the criteria
every five years. 77 Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, the EPA
announced that it would continue with the same standards for
so-called particulate matter (PM2.5) that were determined in
2012. 78 Importantly, particulate matter has been associated
with a higher rate of COVID-19 infection and lethality. 79
In this delicate scenario, the EPA opted to continue with the
12-μg/m3 standard, despite its own findings that a stricter
standard of about 9-μg/m3 would present a risk reduction of 21–
27% and save up to approximately 12,150 lives per year. 80
Public health experts were vocal in opposing the EPA’s decision
because it “defies scientific research.” 81 Surely, regarding
uncertainties about the science, the statutory standard
requiring an “adequate margin of safety” should point to more
stringent standards, not the opposite. 82 This is especially the
case in light of the pandemic.
Importantly, in a study published in 2020 (and authored by
75. Xiao Wu et al., Exposure to Air Pollution and COVID-19 Mortality in
the United States: A Nationwide Cross-Sectional Study, MEDRXIV (Apr. 27,
2020),
https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/files/covidpm/files/pm_and_covid_mortality_med.pdf.
76. 42 U.S.C. § 7408 (determines the establishment, review, and revision
of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards—NAAQS).
77. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(d)(1).
78. EPA Proposes to Retain NAAQS for Particulate Matter, EPA (Apr. 14,
2020),
https://www.epa.gov/newsreleases/epa-proposes-retain-naaqsparticulate-matter.
79. Leonardo Setti et al., Rapid Response: Is There a Plausible Role for
Particulate Matter in the Spreading of COVID-19 in Northern Italy?, BMJ (Apr.
8, 2020), https://www.bmj.com/content/368/bmj.m1103/rr.
80. POLICY ASSESSMENT FOR THE REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL AMBIENT AIR
QUALITY STANDARDS FOR PARTICULATE MATTER, EXTERNAL REVIEW DRAFT, supra
note 74, at 3−91. The number resulted from calculating 27% of the 45,000 total
deaths estimated to occur under the current standard.
81. Coral Davenport, ‘Unbelievable’ Timing: As Coronavirus Rages,
Trump Disregards Advice to Tighten Clean Air Rules, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/14/climate/coronavirus-soot-cleanair-regulations.html.
82. Seth Jaffe, EPA Remains the “Anti-Environmental Protection Agency”;
Wheeler Refuses to Tighten the PM2.5 NAAQS, L. & ENV’T (Apr. 15, 2020),
https://www.lawandenvironment.com/2020/04/15/epa-remains-the-antienvironmental-protection-agency-wheeler-refuses-to-tighten-the-pm-2-5naaqs/ (citing Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1976) as a landmark
case determining that the EPA should be prepared to regulate despite
uncertainty if it is to fulfill its mission to protect the public).
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the former members of the Clean Air Scientific Advisory
Committee), the scientific evidence is conclusive: the EPA’s new
standard is insufficient and particularly harmful to minorities. 83
This, of course, is conspicuously worrisome from a climatejustice standpoint in a moment when the populace of the United
States is calling for equality on all fronts. It is also concerning
in light of the scientific standard of using the best evidence
available, as additional studies have shown that more stringent
standards for PM2.5 (namely, a 10-μg/m3 standard) would save
more than 143,000 lives in a decade. 84
The EPA’s decision to maintain the 2012 standard denies
science, imposes high costs upon the wellbeing of the U.S.
population, contributes to avoidable deaths, increases air
pollution, and favors the conditions in which COVID-19 can
aggressively spread and lead to critical outcomes. 85 A similar
effect will be caused by the EPA’s proposed rule to regulate
carbon GHG emissions from aircraft, which was hurriedly issued
to avoid a lawsuit against the EPA for lack of regulation under
the Clean Air Act. 86
D. The Repeal of the Clean Power Plan and Related Threats to
Air Quality
The Trump administration intends to repeal the Clean
Power Plan, 87 which is crucial to the achievement of U.S.
83. Independent Particulate Matter Review Panel, The Need for a Tighter
Particulate-Matter Air-Quality Standard, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 680, 681−82
(June
10,
2020),
https://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMsb2011009?articleTools=true.
84. X. Wu et al., Evaluating the Impact of Long-Term Exposure to Fine
Particulate Matter on Mortality Among the Elderly, 6 SCI. ADVANCES, 1 (2020).
85. See Damian Carrington, Is Air Pollution Making the Coronavirus
Pandemic Even More Deadly?, GUARDIAN (May 4, 2020, 2:00 AM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/may/04/is-air-pollution-making-thecoronavirus-pandemic-even-more-deadly (highlighting the connection between
exposure to air pollution, which damages lungs and hearts, and the increased
likelihood of being more severely affected).
86. See Coral Davenport, E.P.A. Proposes Airplane Emission Standards
TIMES
(July
22,
2020),
that
Airlines
Already
Meet,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/22/climate/airplanes-climate-change.html
(noting that the standards were issued to benefit the U.S. aircraft industry’s
international sales as the proposed rule adopts a United Nations basic
standard from 2016).
87. FACT SHEET: PROPOSAL TO REPEAL THE CLEAN POWER PLAN, EPA
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contributions as determined by the Paris Agreement. 88 This
policy decision illustrates another instance of the Trump
administration’s complete disregard for the totality of costs
involved in its deregulatory action. 89 More specifically, the EPA
currently claims that the repeal will save $33 billion in
compliance costs through 2030. 90 This calculation, however, has
been disputed. 91 Other recent changes relating to this costbenefit analysis are also dubious. 92 The choice by the EPA to
rely on estimations that ignored key health benefits 93 has led to
recent litigation with the goal of halting rollback of the Clean
Power Plan. 94
A proposed rule that will loosen limits on mercury emissions
from power plants will likely have similar effects. 95 This
deregulatory action has also been subject to severe criticism
regarding the computation of benefits, with its cost-benefit
Accordingly, the
analysis being specifically condemned. 96
(2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fsproposed-repeal-cpp-final_oct10.pdf?mod=article_inline.
88. Anna McGinn, Understanding the Paris Agreement, SCHOLARS
STRATEGY
NETWORK
(Apr.
12,
2019),
https://scholars.org/contribution/understanding-paris-agreement.
89. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., VALUING CLIMATE DAMAGES:
UPDATING ESTIMATION OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON DIOXIDE 51 (2017)
(ebook).
90. EPA, supra note 87.
91. NAT’L ACADS. OF SCI., ENG’G & MED., supra note 89, at 51 (disputing
the administration’s focus on domestic contributions instead of considering the
global impact of emissions and climate change); see also SUNSTEIN, supra note
42, at 159 (contending the change from global to domestic emissions is
unjustified as “the height of arbitrariness”).
92. The EPA’s fact sheet acknowledges other changes that differ from the
Obama administration, namely: domestic costs are no longer compared to
domestic benefits and energy efficiency is no longer viewed as a benefit, but
rather as an avoided cost showing “the true magnitude of the CPP’s [(Clean
Power Plan’s)] costs.” EPA, supra note 87.
93. Dan Farber, The Flight from Evidence-Based Regulation,
LEGALPLANET (Mar. 19, 2020), https://legal-planet.org/2020/03/19/the-flightfrom-evidence-based-regulation/.
94. See, e.g., Am. Lung Ass’n v. EPA, 134 F.3d 388 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
95. See MEMORANDUM ON COMPLIANCE COST, HAP BENEFITS, AND
ANCILLARY CO-POLLUTANT BENEFITS FOR “NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR
HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS: COAL-AND OIL-FIRED ELECTRIC UTILITY STEAM
GENERATING UNITS—RECONSIDERATION OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDING AND
RESIDUAL RISK AND TECHNOLOGY REVIEW,” EPA (Dec. 14, 2018),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2018-12/documents/mats-an-costbenefit_memo12-2018.pdf.
96. Farber, supra note 93.
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rollback of the Clean Power Plan and the proposed mercury
emission rule are likely to negatively impact both health and the
environment, and will specifically contribute to an increase in
GHG emissions.
E. The Flexibilization of the National Environmental Policy
Act
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), which
was created by the Nixon Administration in 1970, is a
foundational law for environmental protection in the United
States. 97 As such, it is perhaps no surprise that it was a target
for the deregulatory efforts of the Trump administration; the
Council of Environmental Quality, ostensibly aiming at
enhancing efficiency and fostering economic growth, proposed to
A key aspect of NEPA ensures that
reform NEPA. 98
“unquantified” environmental values are considered throughout
the decision-making process, which includes weighing the costs
and benefits of every major action that might significantly
impact the environment. 99
Among the main modifications proposed by the Trump
administration is elimination of the consideration of cumulative
and indirect impacts such as climate change; the proposed rule
clearly promotes the usage of expedited decisions at the expense
of federal environmental reviews. 100 The proposed rule not only
97. Richard J. Lazarus, The Greening of America and the Graying of
United States Environmental Law: Reflections on Environmental Law’s First
Three Decades in the United States, 20 VA. ENV’T L.J. 75, 76–77 (2001)
(emphasizing how environmental-protection law was “essentially nonexistent”
in the United States before 1970 and that the NEPA was signed into law on
the first day of that year).
98. See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural
Provisions of the National Environmental Policy Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 1684
(proposed Jan. 10, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500, 1501, 1502, 1503,
1504, 1505, 1507, 1508). This proposal was updated on July 16, 2020, when
the CEQ issued its final rule maintaining the CEQ previous proposed rule. For
the final rule, which as of this writing and until September 14, 2020, is still
subject to congressional review.
See also Update to the Regulations
Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the National Environmental Policy
Act, 85 Fed. Reg. 43,304 (July 16, 2020) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 1500,
1501, 1502, 1503, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1507, 1508, 1515, 1516, 1517, 1518).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(B).
100. Joseph DeQuarto, Landmark Environmental Rules Slated for
REV.
(Feb.
18,
2020),
Overhaul,
REGULATORY
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/02/18/dequarto-landmark-environmental-
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sets stricter deadlines on the environmental-review process, but
also allows private entities to review such decisions in place of
federal agencies, and significantly reduces the scope of both
federal actions that would trigger review under NEPA and the
public-comment process. 101 Therefore, the proposed rule can be
considered to implement unreasoned modifications that
jeopardize policy assessments, as it reduces deadlines and
exempts projects from NEPA review, removing significant public
participation at a time when the nation is calling for inclusion
and equality. The proposed rule is also likely to hasten approval
of projects with significant environmental impact, which may
contribute to GHG emissions and deteriorate air quality.
F. The Rollback of Regulations Promoting Fuel Efficiency
The U.S. EPA’s proposed rule on unifying fuel-economy
standards 102 has sparked criticism 103 because it is estimated to
cost more than $400 billion by 2050 and may increase GHGs
related to transportation emissions by ten percent. 104 Key
industry actors have vowed to follow California’s more stringent
standards, 105 and have faced investigations by the Justice
rules-slated-overhaul/.
101. See id.
102. Final Rule: One National Program on Federal Preemption of State
Fuel
Economy
Standards,
EPA
(Mar.
31,
2020),
https://www.epa.gov/regulations-emissions-vehicles-and-engines/final-ruleone-national-program-federal-preemption-state.
103. Consumer Reports shows that the proposed rule would be too costly
and, significantly, would not offer the security improvements that the
president has claimed. See Chris Harto et al., The Un-SAFE Rule: How a FuelEconomy Rollback Costs Americans Billions in Fuel Savings and Does Not
REPS.
(Aug.
7,
2019),
Improve
Safety,
CONSUMER
https://advocacy.consumerreports.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/08/The-UnSAFE-Rule-How-a-Fuel-Economy-Rollback-Costs-Americans-Billions-in-FuelSavings-and-Does-Not-Improve-Safety-2.pdf.
104. Megan Mahajan, Trump’s Clean Car Rollback Will Cost up to $400
Billion, Increase Transport Emissions 10%, FORBES (Aug. 7, 2019, 7:30 AM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2019/08/07/trumps-clean-carrollback-could-cost-up-to-400-billion-increase-transport-emissions10/?sh=5446c92e3b46.
105. Hiroko Tabuchi, States Sue to Block Trump from Weakening Fuel
TIMES
(May
27,
2020),
Economy
Rules,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/27/climate/lawsuit-fuel-economyclimate.html (emphasizing that the auto industry is split over the measure,
but Ford, Honda, BMW, and Volkswagen are against the rollback).
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Department, allegedly in retaliation for opposing President
Trump. 106 California, twenty-two other states, and the cities of
Los Angeles and New York are suing the administration for the
revocation of California’s standards. 107 The cost-benefit analysis
of the Clean Car Standards almost exclusively uses co-benefits
to justify the EPA’s proposed deregulation. 108 The Clean Car
deregulatory measures have also underestimated climate
damage through use of an arbitrary calculation of the social cost
of carbon. 109
The administration’s own estimates acknowledge that the
rollback of car standards could range from a $22 billion net cost
for society to net benefits of $6.4 billion. 110 This wide range is
the result of using different discount rates: if a three percent
discount rate is used (the typical rate used by the federal
government), the new rule will be costly; it will have net benefits
106. Catherine Rampell, Trump is All About Deregulation—Except When
It Comes to His Enemies, WASH. POST (May 28, 2020, 7:28 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/trump-is-all-about-deregulation-except-when-it-comes-to-his-enemies/2020/05/28/dcfb9638-a116-11ea-b5c9570a91917d8d_story.html (highlighting how the administration has “cook[ed]
the books” on its cost-benefit analysis and how the President’s deregulatory
agenda was never about maximizing the interest of the country but was
intended to reward friends and punish enemies).
107. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, California v.
Chao, No. 1:19-cv-02826 (D.D.C. Sept. 20, 2019). An additional lawsuit that
has been filed by California and thirteen other states challenges the “Safer
Affordable Fuel-Efficient (SAFE) Vehicles Rule for Model Years 2021-2026
Passenger Cars and Light Trucks,” published at 85 Fed. Reg. 24,174 (Apr. 30,
2020), and “Mid-Term Evaluation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Standards for
Model Year 2022-2025 Light-Duty Vehicles,” published at 83 Fed. Reg. 16,077
(Apr. 13, 2018). See also California v. Wheeler, No. 20-1357 (D.C. Cir. Sept.
14, 2020).
108. Richard L. Revesz, Trump Shows his Cards on Environmental
Protections—Or a Lack Thereof, HILL (Apr. 30, 2020, 6:30 PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/495457-trump-shows-hiscards-on-environmental-protections-or-lack-thereof.
109. Key Economic Errors in the Clean Car Standards Rollback, N.Y.U.
INST.
POL’Y
INTEGRITY
1,
2
(Apr.
1,
2020),
https://policyintegrity.org/files/media/Vehicles_Emissions_Rollback__Key_Economic_Errors.pdf (discussing additional faults of the EPA’s costbenefit analysis).
110. See NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN. & EPA, FINAL
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: THE SAFER AFFORDABLE FUEL-EFFICIENT
(SAFE) VEHICLES RULE FOR MODEL YEAR 2021–2026 PASSENGER CARS AND
LIGHT
TRUCKS,
(Mar.
30,
2020),
https://www.nhtsa.gov/sites/nhtsa.dot.gov/files/documents/final_safe_fria_web
_version_200330.pdf (for three and seven percent discount rates, respectively).
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only if a seven percent discount rate is used. 111 Litigation is
poised to proceed. The Second Circuit reversed an earlier
district-court decision, ruling that the EPA shall disclose the
components of its model for the evaluation of GHG vehicle
standards. 112 The legal system, so far, has been unconvinced by
the justifications provided by the administration and are acting
as a check on potential threats to environmental protection and
increasing GHG emissions.
G. The Flexibilization of Regulatory Standards and Overall
Enforcement during COVID-19
Another deregulatory measure implemented by the Trump
administration that may negatively impact climate change,
while neglecting proper cost considerations, is the flexibilization
of regulatory standards and enforcement that agencies might
consider in order to encourage economic recovery in the
aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. This deregulatory action,
which was implemented by an executive order, 113 appears to
grant agencies the discretion to limit enforcement actions to
willful violations. If this is the case, this measure is likely to be
more difficult to challenge in courts, as it falls within
administrative discretion. 114
Despite such discretion, litigation is expected to occur. The
EPA’s initial guidance implementing such flexibilization will be

111. Coral Davenport, Trump Calls New Fuel Economy Rule a Boon. Some
Experts
See
Steep
Costs,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
31,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/31/climate/trump-pollution-rollback.html.
112. Nat. Res. Def. Council v. EPA, 954 F.3d 150, 157 n.6 (2d Cir. 2020)
(noting that the deliberations were already disclosed).
113. Exec. Order No. 13924, 85 Fed. Reg. 31,353 (May 22, 2020).
Technically, this Executive Order, which was called the Executive Order on
Regulatory Relief to Support Economic Recovery, directs heads of federal
agencies to temporarily or permanently relax or remove regulations that may
impede economic recovery from the coronavirus pandemic. Id.
114. Seth D. Jaffe, Has President Trump Just Limited Enforcement to
Willful
Violations?,
MONDAQ,
(June
4,
2020),
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/environmental-law/947236/haspresident-trump-just-limited-enforcement-to-willful-violations (defining this
order as the most significant deregulatory measure taken by the Trump
administration).
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short-lived, 115 as it is to be terminated by August 31, 2020. 116
Nonetheless, the majority of facilities that are impacted by such
rollback are likely to report their emissions on the Toxic Release
Inventory (“TRI”), a database maintained by the EPA on
industrial and federal facilities. 117 There are more than 21,800
such facilities nationwide, and, in 2016, more than two-thirds of
the U.S. population resided in the same zip code as an
operational TRI site. 118 A study conducted by scientists at the
American University found that, during the rollback, these
facilities actually increased pollution, which may have
subsequently increased the conditional daily COVID-19 death
rate by 10.5% and the case rate by 53.7%. 119 Experts have noted
that this sector is behaving opportunistically and that the EPA’s
guidance regarding factory pollution does not require
assessment of the potential impact of increased pollution on
public health that is already jeopardized by COVID-19. 120
Accordingly, the flexibilization of regulatory standards and
related enforcement, which was done hastened and in patent
disregard of costs, is likely to contribute to the increase of GHG
emission and overall pollution. This is the case, as industries
and market actors may have taken advantage of the lack of
enforcement, interpreting it as a free pass to pollute, in practice.
H. Contextualizing the Findings of the Previous Sections
This Section has presented the attacks on climate science
that are likely to negatively affect both GHG emissions and the
115. Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement
and
Compliance
Assurance
Program,
EPA (Mar.
26,
2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202003/documents/oecamemooncovid19implications.pdf.
116. Susan Parker Bodine, COVID-19 Implications for EPA’s Enforcement
and Compliance Assurance Program: Addendum on Termination, EPA (June
29,
2020),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/202006/documents/covid19addendumontermination.pdf.
117. Claudia L. Persico & Kathryn R. Johnson, The Effects of Increased
Pollution on COVID-19 Cases and Deaths 3 (June 22, 2020),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3633446.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 29.
120. Rena Steinzor, The Pandemic and Industry Opportunism,
REGULATORY
REV.
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.theregreview.org/2020/04/08/steinzor-pandemic-industryopportunism/.
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overall outcomes of COVID-19. Additionally, it has discussed
significant deregulatory climate policies that have been
proposed by the Trump administration and are likely to
negatively impact the environment and public health. On both
fronts, it is clear that the deregulatory climate measures
proposed by the Trump administration disregard the best
available science, including the social cost of carbon, despite
being required to consider both. 121 This implementation without
proper assessment of science and cost considerations will have
significant consequences, not only for the current health and
climate crises, but also for the economic crisis that will likely
follow the pandemic.
The findings of this Section are coherent with previous work
that found consistent disdain for regulatory science throughout
the Trump administration. 122 The President’s disdain for
science has perhaps never been more evident than in his
handling of the COVID-19 pandemic, during which he
monopolized briefings by the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention (“CDC”) and politicized medical advice in an
unprecedented fashion. 123 His actions during the pandemic,
which often contradict the advice of his own technical experts,
have led to both national and international criticism. 124
Moreover, the Trump administration’s deregulatory actions
have not only neglected scientific knowledge, but they also are
consistently dismissive of best regulatory practices and the
121. See, e.g., OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, CIRCULAR A-4, “REGULATORY
ANALYSIS,”
(Sept.
17,
2003),
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/circulars/A4/a4.pdf; see also Exec. Order No. 13783, 82 Fed. Reg. 16,095 (Mar. 31, 2017)
(requiring consideration of best scientific evidence available and social cost of
carbon).
122. See, e.g., Albert C. Lin, President Trump’s War on Regulatory Science,
43 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 247, 301–02 (2019).
123. See generally Steve Coll, The Meaning of Donald Trump’s
Coronavirus
Quackery,
NEW
YORKER
(Mar.
29,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/04/06/the-meaning-of-donaldtrumps-coronavirus-quackery (describing how the President considered
reopening the country by Easter, against the recommendation of health
experts, because he thought “it was a beautiful time”).
124. See Lisa Friedman & Brad Plumer, Trump’s Response to Virus
Reflects a Long Disregard for Science, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/climate/trump-coronavirus-climatescience.html (including ridicule when the President suggested that injecting
disinfectants might be helpful).
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The administration’s
normative use of economics. 125
deregulatory measures also conflict with the long-held
assumption that cost-benefit analysis is an effective method
through which to determine the maximization of overall
wellbeing. 126
These findings are also aligned with previous literature,
which contends that the administration’s policies have
discredited cost-benefit analysis, ultimately turning it into a
“perversion of a neutral approach to policymaking.” 127 An
illustrative example of this trend is the Trump administration’s
support for coal producers, which has provided incentives for the
continued production of a source of energy that is both inefficient
and the worst contributor to GHG emissions. 128
In the aggregate, all of the deregulatory climate actions
pursued by the Trump administration and analyzed in this
Section will negatively impact air quality and increase GHG
emissions. To put these deregulatory measures in perspective:
two major actions of the current administration, continuance of
the particulate matter standard and the rollback of the Clean
Power Plan, could lead to more than 90,000 deaths. 129 Although
this is less than the current death toll of the COVID-19
pandemic in the United States, 130 the total effect of all the
rollbacks pursued by the Trump administration may well
surpass the number of deaths caused by the virus. Accordingly,
125. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 402−03 (7th ed.
2007) (noting that the cost-benefit analysis as a regulatory tool has different
meanings that range from the normative use of economics to using the criterion
of wealth maximization when evaluating a particular policy).
126. See generally ADLER & POSNER, supra note 40, at 62.
127. Rena Steinzor, Cost-Benefit Analysis According to the Trump
Administration,
REGULATORY
REV.
(July
23,
2019),
https://www.theregreview.org/2019/07/23/steinzor-cost-benefit-analysisaccording-trump-administration/.
128. For information on the carbon impact of coal in relation to other
sources, see infra Figure 1, in the Appendix.
129. See Dan Farber, Trump’s EPA May Cause as Many U.S. Deaths as
the
Coronavirus,
LEGALPLANET
(Apr.
20,
2020),
https://legalplanet.org/2020/04/20/could-trumps-epa-cause-as-many-american-deaths-asthe-coronavirus/ (arguing that although President Trump’s measures are more
gradual, deregulation can be as deadly as the pandemic).
130. The official death count in the United States through March 2, 2021,
is 513,122. United States COVID-19 Cases and Deaths by State, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/cases-updates/us-casesdeaths.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2021).
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such climate policies do not maximize wellbeing. Further, they
will have a devastating economic impact due to the disregard of
valid cost considerations related to the preservation of health
and life, to the environment, and to the climate as a whole. The
consequences could not be more severe.
III. THE MAIN CONSEQUENCES OF PRESIDENT TRUMP’S CLIMATE
POLICIES FOR THE PANDEMIC: AN INTERNATIONAL LAW
PERSPECTIVE
As established in Part II, the combination of the Trump
administration’s attacks on climate science and related
deregulatory policies contributes to an increase in pollution,
including GHG emissions, that aggravates the consequences of
COVID-19. Part III discusses the Trump administration’s
climate policies in the international arena with a focus upon
analysis of a major deregulatory action that will negatively
impact the pandemic: the United States’ withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement. It also examines the withdrawal in the
aftermath of the pandemic, focusing on principles of
international law and state liability for environmental harms.
This Part is premised upon the negative consequences of the
Trump administration’s climate policies, especially regarding
their impact on the country’s Nationally Determined
Contribution (“NDC”) under the Paris Agreement 131 and GHG
emissions. 132 The original U.S. NDC, which required only that
the country continue its trend of reducing carbon emissions, 133
received criticism for its relatively timid target. 134 The Trump
131. See generally Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 4(2) (“Each Party
shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined
contributions that it intends to achieve. Parties shall pursue domestic
mitigation measures, with the aim of achieving the objectives of such
contributions.”).
132. Id. at art. 2(b) (including among the goals of the Agreement:
“Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and
foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development”).
133. See Dana Nuccitelli, Fact Check: China Pledged Bigger Climate
Action than the USA; Republican Leaders Wrong, GUARDIAN (Nov. 14, 2014,
9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97per-cent/2014/nov/14/fact-check-china-pledged-bigger-climate-actionrepublican-leaders-wrong.
134. See, e.g., Luke Kemp, Better Out Than In, 7 NAT. CLIMATE CHANGE
458, 458 (2017).
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administration, however, considered the NDC as an obstacle to
economic growth, a belief that is illustrated by its repeal of the
Clean Power Plan, 135 which is crucial to achievement of the U.S.
NDC. 136 Though the NDCs are not mandatory targets, this
disregard for the country’s NDC has raised alarm. 137 From an
international law perspective, NDCs were a minimum
expectation, and some experts have been vocal about their
insufficiency. 138 While the United States has formally notified
its intent to withdraw from the Paris Agreement, 139 the country
remains a member of the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”). 140
So far, President Trump and the State Department have not
pursued any formal efforts to withdraw from the UNFCCC. 141
Hence, the United States should continue to prioritize UNFCCC
goals: protecting the climate system, considering climate change
when formulating domestic policies, and remaining committed
to combating the high concentration of GHGs. 142

135. See generally EPA, ELECTRIC UTILITY GENERATING UNITS: REPEALING
CLEAN
POWER
PLAN:
PROPOSAL
(2017),
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2017-10/documents/fs-proposedrepeal-cpp-final_oct10.pdf.
136. See generally McGinn, supra note 88 (explaining that NDC
contributions by the U.S. were based “almost entirely on the Clean Power
Plan”).
137. NDCs are voluntary targets determined by each country. See
generally The Paris Agreement: Frequently Asked Questions, U.N. (Sept. 12,
2016),
https://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/blog/2016/09/the-parisagreement-faqs/.
138. Michael B. Gerrard, Climate Change and Human Trafficking After
the Paris Agreement, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 345, 353–54 (2018).
139. On November 4, 2019, the United States served notice of the
withdrawal on the first date possible under the Paris Agreement. Lisa
Friedman, Trump Serves Notice to Quit Paris Climate Agreement, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 4, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/04/climate/trump-parisagreement-climate.html.
140. To confirm that the United States remains a party to the UNFCCC
treaty, visit United Nations Climate Change, https://unfccc.int/process/partiesnon-party-stakeholders/parties-convention-and-observer-states (last visited
Mar. 2, 2021).
141. Wentz & Gerrard, supra note 17, at 63.
142. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 2-4, at 9–15.
THE
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A. The United States’ Withdrawal from Paris is Likely to
Negatively Impact the COVID-19 Crisis
Given the nature of the emissions and amount of pollution
that will be caused by the Trump administration’s attacks on
climate science and deregulatory climate policies, there will be
significant impacts beyond U.S. borders.
This Section
articulates law, economic concepts, and methodologies from an
international perspective. It is principled on the notion that
“Preventing all harm” “[is not] socially desirable,” as it will be
“too costly” for all nations. 143 Accordingly, and because the
negative effects of climate change have major consequences for
“the environment that fall[] outside the jurisdiction of individual
states (and . . . [might not be] owned by any natural or legal
person),” 144 law and economics (cost-benefit analysis, in
particular) are frequently applied to determine the optimal
levels of pollution and to minimize the impact upon people living
in affected areas. In this vein, the UNFCCC 145 aims to avoid the
dangerous effects of emissions but not to prohibit all emissions
(as “the social costs would be too high”). 146
The Paris Agreement, often cited as the only effective
institutional solution to climate change, 147 also follows these
premises. It has been considered a historic breakthrough, as it
marked the end of a decade-long stalemate over the full
integration of the United States (and developing economies) into

143. Michael Faure & Marjan Peeters, Liability and Climate Change, in
OXFORD RESEARCH ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CLIMATE SCIENCE 1, 2 (Hans Von Storch
ed., 2019).
144. Id. at 3.
145. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 2, at 9, determines the following: “The
ultimate objective of this Convention and any related legal instruments that
the Conference of the Parties may adopt is to achieve, in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Convention, stabilization of greenhouse gas
concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous
anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be
achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally
to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to
enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.” (emphasis
added).
146. Faure & Peeters, supra note 143, at 3.
147. Mark Cooper, Governing the Global Climate Commons: The Political
Economy of State and Local Action, After the U.S. Flip-Flop on the Paris
Agreement, 118 ENERGY POL’Y 440, 441 (2018).
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the climate regime. 148 At this point, a technical note is required:
this Article acknowledges, but dismisses, the controversy
concerning the legal status of the Paris Agreement under U.S.
law, 149 as both the Obama and Trump administrations
considered it an executive agreement. 150 Under international
law, however, the Paris Agreement is a treaty, 151 and the United
States is legally bound until the withdrawal becomes effective. 152
The justifications provided by the Trump administration to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement do not pass a close-scrutiny
test, let alone a comprehensive cost-benefit analysis that
148. Meinhard Doelle, Assessment of Strengths and Weaknesses, in THE
PARIS AGREEMENT ON CLIMATE CHANGE: ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARY 387
(Daniel Klein et al. eds., 2017) (highlighting the importance of engaging all
parties in a global effort to respond effectively to climate change).
149. U.S. domestic law on treaties is not trivial, because the terminology
used in international law and U.S. domestic law differs. Under international
law, all written international agreements governed by international law are
referred to as “treaties,” whereas in U.S. law, only some are labeled as such.
According to U.S. law, the president has the power to sign a treaty, but it does
not go into effect until it is ratified by two-thirds of the Senate. U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2. Executive agreements are international agreements concluded by
the president under independent constitutional authority in his capacity as
commander-in-chief, but these agreements are treaties for international law
purposes. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW 70 (7th ed. 2018).
150. See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris
Agreement, 25 REV. EUR. COMP. & INT’L ENV’T L. 142 (2016). The Department
of State determined the Paris Agreement did not address substantive legal
obligations beyond those stated in its parent treaty, the UNFCCC, supra note
19, and concluded there was no need to submit it to the Senate. U.S. DEP’T OF
STATE, THE HANDBOOK ON TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS:
THE
ROLE
OF
THE
UNITED
STATES
SENATE
(2001),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CPRT-106SPRT66922/pdf/CPRT106SPRT66922.pdf.
151. Under international law, the Paris Agreement is unequivocally a
treaty. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treatises art. 2, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980). The United States signed the
Paris Agreement on Apr. 22, 2016, and the treaty entered into force on Nov. 4,
2016. Paris Agreement, supra note 20, art. 20, at 24; see, e.g., Bodansky, supra
note 150, at 142; cf. Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris Agreement on Climate
Change: Behind Closed Doors, GLOB. ENV’T POL. 1, 3 (2016). For purposes of
this Article, this controversy is not determinative, because the United States
is legally bound to the provisions of the agreement under international law,
regardless of domestic determinations. Importantly, “international law makes
clear that U.S. presidents cannot simply delete prior signatures from treaties.”
KOH, supra note 20, at 40.
152. According to the Paris Agreement, there is a three-year minimum
period after its entry into force for parties to withdraw. Paris Agreement,
supra note 20, art. 28, at 25. Hence, the U.S. can only effectively withdraw on
November 4, 2020.
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considers domestic and international factors. 153 Cost-benefit
analysis theorists have long defended respect for international
law. 154 In the case of the Paris Agreement, President Obama
clearly understood that regulation (meaning, in this case,
commitment to voluntary standards aiming at curbing carbon
emissions) has a net benefit. 155
Under President Trump and in sharp contrast, climate
science and regulations have been undermined in contemporary
U.S. policy. Under his leadership, U.S. policy has assumed that
the country is free-riding, though novel research shows that the
country will be among those hit the hardest by climate change. 156
This challenge will likely be further magnified by the aftermath
of the COVID-19 pandemic, specifically the economic crisis and
potential rebound in emissions. Moreover, such climate policies
will likely increase the costs of doing business in the country,
while removing economic opportunities that would have been
generated if the administration had considered climate change
and its consequences. 157 Hence, the withdrawal does not
maximize welfare; instead, it will almost certainly damage both
the United States and the rest of the world. 158
The Paris withdrawal will ultimately enable the United
States to emit more pollutants and reduce its mitigation costs
153. For a detailed analysis, see Carolina Arlota, Does the United States’
Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement on Climate Change Pass the Cost-Benefit
Analysis Test?, 41 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 881, 907−34 (2020).
154. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 185–86 (2005).
155. See generally Barack Obama, The Irreversible Momentum of Clean
Energy, 355 SCI. 126 (2017) (arguing the Paris Agreement is not a partisan
issue, as it fosters the U.S. low emissions economy and its renewable energy
industry and employment therein, maintaining U.S. competitiveness while
enhancing the country’s climate security).
156. Matthew E. Kahn et al., Long-Term Macroeconomic Effects of
Climate Change: A Cross-Country Analysis, 5−32 (Int’l Monetary Fund,
Working Paper 19/215, 2019) (discussing the economic impact, specifically).
157. See generally DONALD J. WUEBBLES ET AL., CLIMATE SCIENCE SPECIAL
REPORT: FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE ASSESSMENT (Linda O. Mearns et al. eds.,
2017) (arguing that the use of scientific information enabling people to prepare
for climate change in advance can provide economic opportunities while
proactively managing the risks, diminishing the negative effects and costs of
climate change over time).
158. Robert N. Stavins, Why Trump Pulled the U.S. Out of the Paris
Accord and What the Consequences Will Be, FOREIGN AFFS. (June 5, 2017),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2017-06-05/why-trump-pulled-us-outparis-accord.
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while the country will begin “squeezing other countries’ emission
space and raising their mitigation costs.” 159 Game theory
suggests that this opportunistic behavior by the Trump
administration may lead to U.S. isolation and perhaps even
retaliatory actions by other parties to the Paris Agreement. 160
World leaders, after all, will behave to avoid uncertainty and to
avert granting opportunities to individual countries (including
the United States) to tear apart international agreements. 161
Despite its free-riding policies, the weight of the United
States on climate leadership remains significant.
The
overwhelming majority of experts contend that the country’s
leadership is crucial to expansion of climate action beyond the
Paris Agreement. 162 Moreover, the United States’ withdrawal is
perceived as undermining the legitimacy of the Accord and the
effectiveness of climate change governance. 163 This is likely the
case, as other countries who are (or will be) willing to commit to
more stringent reductions in the upcoming rounds of their NDCs
under the Paris Agreement may face increasing local opposition
to global action on climate change after the U.S. withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement. 164 At the other end of the spectrum,
159. Zhang Hai-Bin et al., U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Agreement:
Reasons, Impacts, and China’s Response, 8 ADVANCES CLIMATE CHANGE RSCH.
220, 222 (2017).
160. This argument assumes treaties are evidence of true cooperation
among states, rather than representative of interests that coincide. A related
argument is that states would find themselves in a repeated prisoner’s
dilemma or a coordination game. A situation may also develop that involves
the retaliation effect. See Mark A. Chinen, Game Theory and Customary
International Law: A Response to Professors Goldsmith and Posner, 23 MICH.
J. INT’L L. 143, 160–70 (2001).
161. These claims are based on the economic assumptions that, other
things being equal, human beings are reluctant to change (status quo bias) and
are averse to the consequences of risk. For a renowned study on such concepts,
see Daniel Kahneman et al., Anomalies: The Endowment Effect, Loss Aversion,
and Status Quo Bias, 5 J. ECON. PERSPS. 193, 197–203 (1991).
162. David G. Victor, Order from Chaos: America Exits the Climate Stage,
BROOKINGS INST. (June 1, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2017/06/01/america-exits-the-climate-stage/.
163. Hai-Bin et al., supra note 159, at 222.
164. Because of the United States’ withdrawal, the European Union,
China, and Canada face increased domestic opposition, despite being
committed to the Paris Agreement. Emre Peker, Around the World, Climate
Goals Clash with Reality, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2018, 3:39 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/around-the-world-climate-goals-clash-withreality-11544616000.

33

2021

CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES AND COVID-19

127

the absence of the United States from the climate change arena
provides additional incentives for other countries to behave
strategically, 165 and to refrain from more ambitious targets in
their next NDCs.
Recent actions by the Trump administration in the
international sphere, such as the withdrawal from the World
Health Organization (“WHO”) amid the coronavirus pandemic 166
and the United States’ obstructionism on environmental actions
in the United Nations Summit on Global Climate
Negotiations, 167 are the opposite of a constructive leadership
approach. Furthermore, the President reiteratively undermines
science, a habit that is particularly detrimental in the
international sphere where science should foster cooperation
among countries to protect the common good. 168 These actions
are disturbing because the United States’ constructive
leadership is of paramount importance, as the ten years directly
after the signing of the Paris Agreement are crucial to
achievement of its targets. 169 Nonetheless, due to sudden
changes and accompanying uncertainties under President
Trump, U.S. leadership in international climate and health
matters is eroding. 170 President Trump’s actions against
165. Strategic thinking is defined as determining a particular course of
action in relation to the behavior of the counterpart(s) involved. “To illustrate,
a player in American football often runs around the right side as a decoy to fool
the other team while the player carrying the ball runs around the left side. In
contrast, a mountain climber never starts up the south slope as a decoy to fool
the mountain while the main party ascends the north slope. Football is
strategic and mountain climbing is non-strategic.” ROBERT D. COOTER, THE
STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 31 (2000).
166. Coronavirus: Trump Moves to Pull US Out of World Health
Organization, BBC NEWS (July 7, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-uscanada-53327906 (emphasizing that the withdrawal will only be effective on
July 6, 2021, based on a 1948 Resolution of the United States Congress).
167. Somini Sengupta, U.N. Climate Talks End with Few Commitments
TIMES
(Dec.
15,
2019),
and
a
‘Lost’
Opportunity,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/15/climate/cop25-un-climate-talksmadrid.html (noting that the Madrid annual encounter of the Conference of
Parties (“COP”) was one of the worst outcomes in the previous twenty-five
years).
168. David F. Cavers, Science and the Law Symposium: Introduction, 63
MICH. L. REV. 1325, 1329 (1965).
169. Hai-Bin et al., supra note 159, at 223.
170. Cooper, supra note 147, at 450 (noting that the United States was
unable to exert influence at COP 23 and is currently the only U.N. member
who is soon to be out of the Paris Agreement).
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international treaties jeopardize the whole system of
international law and undermine the protection of human
dignity, which is, after all, the “ultimate goal” of international
law. 171
This scenario is particularly concerning not only for the
United States’ reputation and leadership position, but also for
the stigma that may arise out of such actions, as countries now
have to counter the United States’ unfavorable climate policies
and fund-damaging withdrawal from the WHO. 172 It will also be
against the maximization of overall wellbeing in the United
States, as well as globally, because economics improving
environmental quality is often connected to increasing marginal
costs, which, in practice, means that the first steps are also the
most cost-effective. 173 It is noteworthy that law and economic
theorists 174 have argued that increased environmental
performance (favored by stronger environmental regulations)
leads to increased competitiveness among nations and
industries—the so-called Porter hypothesis. 175 Hence, the more
a country considers the protection of health and the
environment, the more wellbeing maximization occurs.
In light of the discussion presented in this Section, it is clear
that the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement,
coupled with the country’s deregulation of climate change
measures that allowed for the treaty’s implementation, will
contribute to an increase in GHG emissions beyond U.S. borders,
as well as to overall adverse climate change impacts. The
following Section overviews this withdrawal, focusing on climate
change liability in the context of President Trump’s recent
claims for China to be held internationally accountable for
COVID-19 damages.

171. PATRICIA PARK, INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR ENERGY AND THE
ENVIRONMENT 3 (2d ed. 2013).
172. Coronavirus: Trump Moves to Pull US Out of World Health
Organization, supra note 166 (highlighting that the United States’ withdrawal
threatens the agency’s financial viability, as the country contributes 15% of the
WHO’s budget).
173. Livermore et al., supra note 34, at 5.
174. MICHAEL G. FAURE & ROY A. PARTAIN, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND
ECONOMICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE 229 (2019).
175. Michael E. Porter, America’s Green Strategy, 264 SCI. AM. 168 (1991).
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B. The U.S. Withdrawal and Liability in the Wake of the
Pandemic: An Overview of International Law Framework
President Trump has been quite vocal in attributing
responsibility for the COVID-19 pandemic to China. 176
Meanwhile, the Trump administration, due to its disdain for
science and its political bias, failed to follow the National
Security Council’s guidance on pandemics (created by President
Obama). 177 Importantly, the provisions often cited to establish
state responsibility for China’s actions, namely Article 1 of the
International Law Commission (“ILC”) on State Responsibility
and customary law, 178 are similar to those for international
environmental harm. In this vein, this Section overviews the
main arguments around and challenges related to climate
change liability that were catalyzed by the U.S. withdrawal from
the Paris Agreement.
Such liability is based on various premises. First, from a
human rights perspective: international human rights bodies
have consistently contended that environmental harms can
adversely affect the enjoyment of human rights. 179 The right to
life, for instance, can be threatened by natural events attributed
to climate change, including floods, storms, droughts, hunger,
malnutrition, scarcity of water, and proliferation of tropical
diseases like malaria; the right to housing is also threatened by
176. Donald G. McNeil, Jr. & Andrew Jacobs, Blaming China for the
Pandemic, Trump Says the U.S. Will Leave the W.H.O, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/health/virus-who.html.
177. See Exec. Office of the President of the United States, Playbook for
Early Response to High-Consequence Emerging Infectious Disease Threats and
Biological Incidents (document not for public distribution, 2016), available at
Dan Diamond & Nahal Toosi, Trump Team Failed to Follow NSC’s Pandemic
(Mar.
25,
2020,
8:00
PM),
Playbook,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/25/trump-coronavirus-nationalsecurity-council-149285.
178. See Henning Lahmann, Does China Really Owe the World Trillions
(May
7,
2020,
1:58
PM),
of
Dollars?,
LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/does-china-really-owe-world-trillions-dollars. In
addition to such provisions, response to the pandemic has specific
determinations under Articles 6 and 7 of the 2005 World Health Organization
International Health Regulations that require notification of a state within 24
hours of outbreak. Id.
179. John H. Knox, Human Rights Principles and Climate Change, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 217 (Cinnamon P.
Carlarne et al. eds., 2016).
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forced misplacement and other environmental factors. 180
“Because climate change is a type of environmental harm,”
human rights obligations that are applicable “in the context of
environmental harm generally should apply to climate change
as well.” 181
Second, the climate policies of the Trump administration
conflict with principles of international law on climate change.
Under the principle of common but differentiated
responsibilities and respective capabilities (“CBDRRC”), which
refers specifically to how responsibilities are allocated among
countries, 182 responsibility for current and historical emissions
are of special importance. 183 The data is clear: the United States
is the world leader in cumulative GHG global emissions, having
contributed approximately 30% of historical GHG emissions. 184
This principle still binds the United States, since it remains a
party to the UNFCCC. 185 Likewise, the principle of intra-andinter-generational equity, as defined in the first part of Article
3(1) of the UNFCCC, 186 is applicable. It determines rights and
obligations regarding the use and enjoyment of natural and
cultural resources inherited by the present generation and
states that they are to be “passed on to future generations in no
worse condition than received.” 187 The legal force of this
180. Id. at 219.
181. Id. at 220.
182. See UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3(1), at 9. (“The Parties should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”).
183. The principle itself is disputed because different countries may reach
different conclusions regarding the optimal level of emission reduction. See,
e.g., Esty & Moffa, supra note 1, at 778–79.
184. DONALD A. BROWN, AMERICAN HEAT: ETHICAL PROBLEMS WITH THE
UNITED STATES’ RESPONSE TO GLOBAL WARMING 156 (2002) (illustrating that
the dataset encompasses the years between 1800 to 2002).
185. Confirming that the United States remains a party to the UNFCCC
treaty:
https://unfccc.int/process/parties-non-party-stakeholders/partiesconvention-and-observer-states.
186. See UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3(1), at 9 (“The Parties should
protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of
humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but
differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.”).
187. Catherine Redgwell, Principles and Emerging Norms in
International Law: Intra-and-Inter-Generational Equity, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 188 (Cinnamon P.
Carlarne et al. eds., 2016).
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principle is disputed, but it should be considered among the
factors that will inform policy decisions regarding climate
None of these principles and
change in the future. 188
agreements, however, are a priority in the Trump
administration’s domestic and international agendas.
A similar rationale applies to the precautionary principle.
According to its formulation under Article 3(3) of the UNFCCC,
parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate,
prevent, or minimize the causes of climate change and to
mitigate its adverse effects, and a lack of scientific certainty
should not be used to postpone measures where threats of
Considering the
serious or irreversible damage exist. 189
damages of climate change and the fact that, as noted above, the
United States remains a party to the UNFCCC, the country
should reduce GHG emissions, the impacts of which are
notoriously difficult to reverse. For some scholars, precaution is
not a binary approach, but instead a spectrum. 190 Nonetheless,
an argument could be made that the precautionary principle
would at least oblige the United States to meet its NDC’s under
the Paris Agreement. Further, conscientious accord with the
precautionary principle would also largely lead to limited use of
old technologies, such as fossil fuels, 191 but the Trump
administration has not hesitated to support expansion of their
use while in power.
The United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement
violates general principles of international law that require
member states “to contribute to the conservation, protection,
and restoration of the integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem”
through good-faith cooperation; and these principles were
recently highlighted in a UN Report. 192 These obligations are
perfected through the principle of non-regression, which
disallows backtracking on environmental protections while
advancing, under the principle of progression, increased
188. See id. at 195–96.
189. UNFCCC, supra note 19, art. 3(3), at 9.
190. Jonathan B. Wiener, Precaution and Climate Change, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE LAW 169 (Cinnamon P.
Carlarne et al. eds., 2016).
191. See id. at 170.
192. U.N. Secretary-General, Gaps in International Environmental Law
and Environment-Related Instruments: Towards a Global Pact for the
Environment, ¶¶ 16–17, U.N. DOC. A/73/419 (Nov. 30, 2018).
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Hence, the Trump
protection in such matters. 193
administration’s decision to withdraw from the Paris
Agreement, as well as to continue supporting fossil fuels, is not
in accord with the principle of non-regression, at the very least.
Having established that the Trump administration’s actions
are clearly in conflict with international human rights and with
multiple international, environmental, and climate law
principles, this Section moves next to the challenges involved in
international liability for climate harms. A technical note is
required at this point: state liability differs from state
responsibility insofar as state liability encompasses situations in
which no illegal or unlawful conduct has occurred, despite any
harm triggered by the conduct. 194 The ILC adopted the Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for International
Wrongful Acts, which addresses the consequences of states’
internationally wrongful activities, 195 but there has been no
consensus to push toward a formalized convention (or treaty),
and no further action has been pursued. 196 Article 1 states that
any internationally wrongful act by a state, whether a lapse of
international obligation or a serious breach of a mandatory norm
of international law, can trigger international consequences for
that state. 197
Currently, state responsibility for harm to the international
environment is based upon the primary rule of the Trail Smelter
arbitration. 198 Under this decision:
193. Id. at ¶ 22.
194. Mark A. Drumbl, Trail Smelter and the International Law
Commission’s Work on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts
and State Liability, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS
FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 87 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A.
Miller ed., 2006).
195. See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, with Commentaries, Rep. of the Int’l L. Comm’n on Its FiftyThird Session, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. Int’l L.
Comm’n 6, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1 (Part 2) [hereinafter Draft
Articles].
196. Drumbl, supra note 194, at 87.
197. Draft Articles, supra note 195, at 32. The latter addresses
reparations of the damages and requires causation between the conduct or
omission of the State and such harm. After the ILC adopted such draft articles,
some commentators prefer referring to them merely as “Articles.”
198. The Trail Smelter Arbitration (1941) involved a Canadian smelter
that produced fumes that caused damages in Washington State. The tribunal
ruled that the activity of the smelter needed to be reduced and regulated in
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No State has the right to use or permit the use of
its territory in such a manner as to cause injury
by fumes in or to the territory of another or the
properties or persons therein, when the case is of
serious consequence and the injury is established
by clear and convincing evidence. 199
Accordingly, countries are obligated to refrain from causing
transboundary harm. 200 This prohibition, as well as the duty to
compensate (the “polluter pays” principle), 201 means that state
responsibility is a double-edged sword, and the international
regime both assumes harm will occur and encourages prevention
of that harm. 202
In this legal regime, the primary rule of the Trail Smelter
arbitration case remains pertinent for cases of environmental
harm, which includes those arising out of climate change. For
instance, it has been contended that the United States’ failure
to take meaningful efforts to reduce carbon emissions under the
Bush and Trump administrations appear to collide with the
main rule established in Trail Smelter. 203 It is noteworthy that
the preamble of the UNFCCC 204 clearly refers to the principles
accordance with the regime determined in the award. See U.N., Reports of
International Arbitration Awards by the United Nations: Trail Smelter Case
1905,
1965
(United
States
v.
Canada,
1941)
(2006),
http://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-1982.pdf [hereinafter Trial Smelter
Arbitration].
199. Id.
200. Id. In addition to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, Trail
Smelter determined that, under the “polluter pays” principle, the polluting
state must compensate for the transboundary harm it caused. Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller, Transboundary Harm in International Law, in
TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL
SMELTER ARBITRATION 3 (Rebecca M. Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
201. Trail Smelter Arbitration, supra note 198; Bratspies & Miller, supra
note 200, at 3–4 (emphasizing the modern declaration of state responsibility
for transboundary harm, while criticizing the narrowness of the decision,
because the defendant was held liable only if the resulting harm was “of serious
economic consequence . . .”) (internal citations omitted).
202. Bratspies & Miller, supra note 200, at 9.
203. Dan Farber, International Liability for Harm: Epidemics and
Pollution,
LEGALPLANET
(May
12,
2020),
https://legalplanet.org/2020/05/12/international-liability-for-harm-epidemics-andpollution/ (referring to liability).
204. UNFCCC, supra note 19, at Preamble (“States have, in accordance
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of the Trail Smelter arbitration in the context of climate
change. 205 Nonetheless, causation is a major obstacle to the
establishment of such international responsibility. 206 To the
extent that the Trail Smelter decision was between two friendly
states, it may be of limited practical relevance for transboundary
pollution problems with multiple tortfeasors, as dispute
settlement in international law remains largely consensual and
apportion of responsibility is very complex in practice. 207
Importantly, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration and the 1992
Rio Declaration also obligate countries to avoid causing
transboundary harm, although this obligation is not absolute. 208
The larger ripples of the Trail Smelter arbitration are evident in
wide-ranging requirements that countries undertake due
diligence 209 and, most importantly, in the adoption of the
However,
obligation into customary international law. 210
countries have defined this obligation differently. In the United
States, for instance, if the EPA “has reason to believe that any
with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international law,
the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure
that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction.”).
205. Russell A. Miller, Surprising Parallels Between Trail Smelter and the
Global Climate Change Regime, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 167 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
206. Malgosia Fitzmaurice, International Responsibility and Liability, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (Daniel
Bodansky et al. eds., 2012).
207. Phoebe Okowa, The Legacy of Trail Smelter in the Field of
Transboundary Air Pollution, in TRANSBOUNDARY HARM IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW: LESSONS FROM THE TRAIL SMELTER ARBITRATION 195, 202 (Rebecca M.
Bratspies & Russell A. Miller eds., 2006).
208. See U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, Report of the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, principle 22 (June 1972); U.N. Conference on
Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), principle 2 (Aug. 12,
1992).
209. Jesse L. Reynolds, International Law, in CLIMATE ENGINEERING AND
THE LAW: REGULATION AND LIABILITY FOR SOLAR RADIATION MANAGEMENT AND
CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL 57, 116 (Michael B. Gerrard & Tracy Hester eds.,
2018).
210. See Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory
Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 (July 8).
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air pollutant or pollutants emitted in the United States cause or
contribute to air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare in a foreign country,” the
agency must act. 211
Despite these mandated requirements for agencies toward
action, Part II clearly showed the oppositional activities
undertaken by the Trump administration. This conflict has
persisted despite unequivocal scientific evidence that “[i]t would
be worth freeing ourselves from fossil fuels even if global
warming didn’t exist,” simply based on the co-benefits of clean
air for public health and the environment. 212 After all, coal is
the single largest contributor of carbon dioxide, is responsible for
more than one-third of global emissions, and is a major factor
that adversely affects public health and biodiversity. 213 The
same study contends that those local co-benefits are not
particularly sensitive to different discount rates, which favors
the immediate adoption of policies phasing out coal. 214
In addition, this Part has illustrated how the United States’
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is likely to negatively
impact the goals of the treaty. Current projections estimate that
the United States may now be able to meet its NDCs for 2020, 215
which became possible mainly due to the suspension of travels
caused by the pandemic. 216 Before the crisis, the UN listed the
country as requiring additional action to meet its NDCs. 217
Currently, the renowned Climate Tracker Action rates United
States’ climate policies as “critically insufficient” (the worst
211. 42 U.S.C. § 7415(a).
212. David Roberts, Air Pollution Is Much Worse than We Thought, VOX
(Aug.
12,
2020,
10:10
AM),
https://www.vox.com/energy-andenvironment/2020/8/12/21361498/climate-change-air-pollution-us-indiachina-deaths (noting that, in a recent hearing of the House Committee on
Oversight and Reform, Drew Shindell discussed the scientific evidence that air
pollution leads to 250,000 deaths per year in the U.S. alone).
213. Sebastian Rauner et al., Coal-Exit Health and Environmental
Damage Reductions Outweigh Economic Impacts, 10 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
308, 308−09 (2020).
214. See id. at 311−12.
215. Country Summary: United States, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (July
30, 2020), https://climateactiontracker.org/countries/usa/ [hereinafter CAT].
216. Id.
217. Emissions Gap Report 2019, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME (Nov. 2019),
https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2019
(showing that the United States was the leader in carbon dioxide emissions per
capita in 2018).
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performance possible under their scale), 218 and the withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement was a determinative factor.
In light of all the arguments addressed in this Section, state
liability for international harms caused by climate change is
rare, as causation and apportion are major hurdles to
enforcement. That said, caution is highly recommended.
President Trump’s choice to withdraw from the Paris Agreement
mirrors in the international sphere his domestic policy of
supporting fossil fuels.
These policies are consistently
denigrating both the United States’ international reputation
and undermining its leadership, while increasing GHG
emissions and global pollution. These consequences negatively
impact the environment and public health of both the United
States as well as the global community, further aggravating the
adverse impact of the pandemic.
IV. THE UNITED STATES CLIMATE POLICIES AND INEQUALITY IN
THE POST-PANDEMIC WORLD
This Part illustrates how the United States’ climate policies
are likely to aggravate both domestic and global inequalities in
It focuses on the
the aftermath of the pandemic. 219
disproportionate impact of climate change on minorities in the
United States and in the developing world, examines
similarities shared by these inequalities, and investigates how
those who are bearing the major consequences of COVID-19
have already begun to face the adverse impacts of climate
change. It also addresses the need for regulatory action based
on prioritarianism and social resilience on the domestic front. In
218. See CAT, supra note 215.
219. Despite focusing on inequalities, this Part does not frame the issue
in terms of climate justice; the vast recent literature which targets historical
emissions and the related, need to share the burden. These issues are
addressed from an international law perspective in Part III, Section B. For
specific references on climate change, see, among others: Lukas H. Meyer &
Dominic Roser, Climate Justice and Historical Emissions, 13 CRITICAL REV.
INT. SOC. & POL. PHIL., 229 (2010); Simon Caney, Two Kinds of Climate Justice:
Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens, 22 J. POL. PHIL. 125 (2014); Paul
Almeida, Climate Justice and Sustained Transnational Mobilization, 16
GLOBALIZATIONS 973 (2019). This Article does recommend caution in applying
morality-based arguments to the behavior of states, as climate change is a
problem due to its harms to people, not to countries. ERIC A. POSNER & DAVID
WEISBACH, CLIMATE CHANGE JUSTICE 6 (2010).
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the international sphere, cooperation among countries remains
a requirement for effective international policies on climate
change and response to the pandemic.
Climate change was interfering with economies around the
world long before the pandemic. The Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change estimates with high confidence that extreme
events may be more devastating economically than the impact
of climate change overall. 220 As the world becomes warmer,
rising global sea levels and forced migration due to
desertification will intensify competition for energy resources
and land. 221 The situation is even more dire in developing
countries, as economic resources are scarce and adaptation
measures are less frequent. In a circular logic, these countries
also suffer more from harm related to climate change than those
in the developed world. 222 Developed countries not only have
more resources but are also located primarily in the Northern
Hemisphere where temperatures are likely to be more
temperate than those in the Southern Hemisphere. 223
Climate change has a disproportionate impact in developing
nations because they have fewer resources to a changing
world. 224 As such, they are more vulnerable to increased
temperatures and any related consequences that might
negatively affect health, cause illness, incapacitate, or even kill
This vulnerability decreases productivity and
people. 225
devastates both family unity and related social networks. 226 As
the increase in GHGs is among one of the leading causes of
climate change, ineffective climate policies (including a less
resolute Paris Agreement) increases the likelihood of excessive
220. Kolstad, supra note 9, at 212.
221. For a legal discussion about the causes of climate change, see CHRIS
WOLD ET AL., CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 5−31 (2009).
222. POSNER & SYKES, supra note 8, at 232.
223. See id.; see also Kolstad, supra note 9, at 213 (finding, with high
confidence, that the impact of climate change varies in accordance with the
geographical location and level of development, among other factors).
224. Kolstad, supra note 9, at 213.
225. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Global
1.5°C,
10−12
(Oct.
2018),
Warming
of
https://report.ipcc.ch/sr15/pdf/sr15_spm_final.pdf (explaining the increase in
number of deaths as well as the costs of malnutrition, respiratory conditions,
infectious vector-borne diseases, and other public health costs).
226. Id. at 20−25 (discussing global predictions of the increase in
temperature that the Paris Agreement aims to avoid).
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rain, snow, tornadoes, flooding, droughts, tsunamis, famines,
and other natural disasters. 227 The UN Security Council
recently recognized climate change as a “threat multiplier,” as
climate-related risks and conflicts are already a reality for
millions of people around the globe, threatening peace and
security. 228 Hence, the likelihood that international conflicts
will arise out of changes related to climate is also significantly
increased.
Considering the gap between developed and
developing countries, and the urgent need for action on climate
matters, the UN enacted the Sustainable Development Goals as
part of its 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. These
goals are meant to serve as an urgent call to action to citizens
across the globe. 229
Although all member states adopted the agenda in 2015 and
are consequently expected to uphold the Sustainable
Development Goals, the Unites States’ withdrawal from both the
WHO and Paris Agreement conflicts with those stated goals. It
is noteworthy that the 2030 Agenda and the Sustainable
Development Goals are the UN’s roadmaps toward fostering
recovery in the aftermath of the pandemic. 230 The adverse
impacts of climate change will be magnified at that time as the
pandemic will deepen systemic socio-economic vulnerabilities,
increase income and wealth gaps, overburden (or decimate)
healthcare systems in less-developed countries, and generally
contribute to the spread of emerging zoonotic diseases. 231
Widening this gap between developed and developing
227. WOLD ET AL., supra note 221, at 5−31.
228. Climate Change Recognized as ‘Threat Multiplier’, UN Security
Council Debates its Impact on Peace, U.N. NEWS (Jan. 25, 2019),
https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/01/1031322 (discussing desertification and
food and energy security).
229. Of the seventeen principles, Goal 7 (affordable and clean energy) and
Goal 13 (climate action) are particularly relevant to the topic at hand. They
demonstrate the need for all countries—developed and developing nations
alike—to commit to effective and responsible actions to protect the
environment and curb global warming.
See The 17 Goals, U.N.,
https://sdgs.un.org/goals (last visited Mar. 6, 2021).
230. See Press Release, Secretary-General, ‘We are Only as Strong as the
Weakest’, Secretary-General Stresses, at Launch of Economic Report on
COVID-19 Pandemic, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/20029 (Mar. 31, 2020)
[hereinafter Press Release].
231. Manfred Lenzen et al., Global Socio-Economic Losses and
Environmental Gains from the Coronavirus Pandemic, PLOS ONE 1, 8–9 (July
9, 2020).
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countries is the fact that the developed world is responsible for
significantly more pollution. A recent review of the literature
highlights that the world’s top 10% of income earners are
responsible for a range of 25%–43% of environmental impact,
while the world’s bottom 10% of earners exert only 3–5% of
impact. 232 Based on such numbers, the study argues that
environmental impact is, to a large extent, caused and driven by
the world’s richest citizens, with affluent households worldwide
being by far the strongest determinant and accelerator of
increased environmental and social impacts. 233
This is even more disturbing if considered in light of the fact
that certain segments of the population will feel the effects of
climate change and extreme weather much more dramatically
than others. The regressive nature of carbon-pricing means that
consumers bear the costs and those with lower socioeconomic
standing, who spend a greater percentage of their income on
non-discretionary goods and services, will suffer more. 234 If it is
true that climate change does not impact people in isolation, it
certainly affects the less well-off disproportionally and in a
vicious cycle. 235 Minorities will be critically affected, as will
those living in disadvantaged socioeconomic areas. 236 Native
and indigenous peoples whose lifestyles depend upon nature will
Therefore, the
also experience heightened difficulties. 237
reduction of GHG emissions and effective climate change
policies are justified on a distributional basis under
prioritarianism, namely, the understanding that regulations
should maximize the wellbeing of all, with priority given to those
232. Thomas Wiedmann et al., Scientists’ Warning on Affluence, 11
NATURE COMMC’NS 1, 3 (2020).
233. See id.
234. TREBILCOCK, supra note 2, at 121.
235. Mark Nuttall, Environmental Institutions and Governance, WILEY
ONLINE
LIBR.
(2018),
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/9781118924396.wbiea2284
(contending that climate change does not impact people in isolation but may
affect indigenous people more severely).
236. Uma Outka & Elizabeth Kronk Warner, Reversing Course on
Environmental Justice Under the Trump Administration, 54 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 101, 126 (2019) (discussing the impact of the U.S. withdrawal from an
environmental justice perspective).
237. IPCC, supra note 225, at 11 (emphasizing, with high confidence, that
indigenous peoples, coastal and island populations, and developing world
inhabitants would be more exposed to the consequences of climate change).
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who are worst off. 238
Prioritarianism can be more effectively achieved if
implemented at the highest sphere of governance. Here, the
pandemic may provide a helpful analogy for the need for action
at the highest levels (both national and global): implementation
of a myriad of local policies is costly, complicated, and ultimately
inefficient, as they are limited to their geographical location. 239
Subnational units are not well suited for regulatory action on
national conduct leading to global externalities. 240 Further,
subnational entities must consider that carbon-intensive
industry, if banned from their region, would simply transfer to
less stringent jurisdictions nearby—so-called “leakage.” 241 Such
regulatory efforts may lead to even greater harm, 242 such as the
hardships that would occur if these jurisdictions were left, due
to loss of industry, with less-developed safety nets for their
population.
In such a context, the lack of federal climate policies in the
United States is negatively affecting the rights of minorities,
which is especially concerning now, as the nation is assessing its
inherent inequality. It is telling that, under the Trump
administration’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic, fossil fuel
interests had faster access to stimulus money than many local
governments did. 243 The pandemic illustrates the extraordinary
damage caused in the absence of an effective national
government. For instance, the delayed federal action forced
states to compete for ventilators and personal protective
equipment, which led to a significant waste of precious time and
resources; meanwhile, the President golfed as the pandemic
worsened. 244 In the global context, it is clear that the “Trump
238. Matthew D. Adler, Future Generations: A Prioritarian View, 77 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1478 (2009).
239. Cary Coglianese & Shana Starobin, The Legal Risks of Regulating
Climate Change at the Subnational Level, REGULATORY REV. (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/09/18/coglianese-starobin-legal-risksclimate-change-subnational/.
240. Jonathan B. Wiener, Think Globally, Act Globally: The Limits of
Local Climate Policies, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2007).
241. Coglianese & Starobin, supra note 239.
242. Wiener, supra note 240, at 1964.
243. Kate Aronoff, The Fed Is Bailing Out Polluters While Cities Struggle,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 30, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/158329/fedbailing-polluters-cities-struggle.
244. Paige Williams, Urgent Care from the Army Corps of Engineers, NEW
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administration’s chaotic management has left an indelible
impression around the world of a country incapable of handling
its own crises, let alone anybody else’s.” 245 In the domestic
sphere, the Trump administration’s response to the pandemic
(with its decentralization to state and local governments) has
been considered “[s]tructured to [f]ail.” 246
According to the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, hospital admissions during the first half of 2020
were, on average, 5.5 times higher for American Indians, 4.4
times higher for Black people, and 4 times higher for Latinos
than they were for white Americans. 247 Telemedicine itself
exacerbates exclusions, as it assumes access to a computer and
internet, a basic command of medical literacy, and minimum
fluency in the English language. Furthermore, various social
determinants of health are plagued by inequity in the United
States, including housing availability, access and utilization of
healthcare, income, levels of education and exposure to disease
due to work function, level of discrimination, and reliance on
public transportation; each of these has been a factor in the
disproportional impact of COVID-19 in the United States. 248
Importantly, traditional environmental justice litigation is
unlikely to change this scenario. In fact, though the literature
states that human rights law may offer an avenue for redress,
claims addressing the disparate impact of policies on minorities
in the United States have not succeeded due to the requirement

YORKER
(Aug.
3,
2020),
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2020/08/03/urgent-care-from-the-armycorps-of-engineers. New York Governor Cuomo observed that “[w]hen
Americans whole concept of life and society was shaken, . . . they needed to see
government perform at its best.” Id.
245. Kevin Rudd, The Coming Post-COVID Anarchy: The Pandemic Bodes
Ill for Both American and Chinese Power—and for the Global Order, FOREIGN
AFFS. (May
6,
2020), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/unitedstates/2020-05-06/coming-post-covid-anarchy.
246. Alejandro E. Camacho & Robert L. Glicksman, The Trump
Administration’s Pandemic Response Is Structured to Fail, REGULATORY REV.
(May 19, 2020), https://www.theregreview.org/2020/05/19/camacho-glicksmantrump-administration-pandemic-response-structured-fail/.
247. John Larsen et al., A Just Green Recovery, RHODIUM GRP. (June 29,
2020), https://rhg.com/research/a-just-green-recovery/.
248. Health Equity Considerations & Racial & Ethnic Minority Groups,
CDC (last updated Feb. 12, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019ncov/community/health-equity/race-ethnicity.html.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol41/iss2/3

48

142

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 41.2

of intent from regulators. 249
Therefore, environmental and international human rights
actions are, perhaps more than ever, 250 paramount to securing a
“fair chance in the race of life” with the path for social resilience
being a requirement to guide regulatory action in the country. 251
In the aftermath of the pandemic, all levels of regulators will
have an unprecedented opportunity to reach out, support
inclusiveness, and implement social resilience actions, including
the creation of jobs and work training, effective distribution of
medication, and investments in family care.
Research
demonstrates that Black, Latino, and Indigenous communities
living in the United States have been disproportionately affected
by the pandemic, and that those who live in high environmental
risk areas are facing more severe impacts. 252 The findings
conclude that the same communities “that have borne the brunt
of the impact of COVID-19 this year have borne the brunt of the
impact of air, water, toxic, and hazardous waste pollution for
decades prior.” 253
Similar results are expected to occur on the global level,
despite data on ethnicity still being a challenge. 254 Economic
inequality, overcrowded housing, environmental risks, limited
availability of healthcare, and bias in access and use of care are
249. See generally Carmen G. Gonzalez, Environmental Racism,
American Exceptionalism, and Cold War Human Rights, 26 TRANSNAT’L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 281, 303−08 (2017).
250. We do note, however, the existence of a climate justice bill with
sponsors in the House and Senate. See generally Environmental Justice for All
Act, H.R. 5986, 116th Cong. (2020). The bill is based on findings that
communities of color, low-income, tribal, and others, including children,
elderly, and persons with disabilities, are disproportionately impacted by
environmental harms. Id.
251. Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert R.M. Verchick, Inequality, Social
Resilience, and the Green Economy, 86 UMKC L. REV. 1, 4, 28–29 (2018)
(discussing the need for social resilience and adaptation to replace social
vulnerability and citing the Clean Power Plant as an example of the EPA’s
regulatory action promoting social resilience when the agency proactively
created jobs for coal miners who would otherwise be jobless). See generally
H.R. 5986, at 22−27.
252. Larsen et al., supra note 247.
253. Id.; see also Figure 2, infra Appendix.
254. Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Racial and Ethnic
Minorities Needs to be Urgently Addressed –Bachelet, U.N. OFF. HIGH COMM’R
HUM.
RTS.
(June
2,
2020),
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=25
916.
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significant factors in explaining the disproportionate global
impact on minorities. Moreover, racial and ethnic minorities are
found in higher numbers in some jobs that carry an increased
risk, such as the “transport, health, and cleaning sectors.” 255
The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle
Bachelet, remarked that the pandemic exposes “inequalities
that have too long been ignored,” despite being obvious. 256 The
deepening of such vulnerabilities is a concern of the World
Health Organization and of other international actors who have
accordingly created a system to ensure access to any future
vaccines: COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access (“COVAX”). 257
However, the question of who will have access to the vaccine still
lingers despite the obvious injustice of a potential situation in
which health care workers in developing nations do not get
access to the vaccine while low-risk people in the developed
world do. 258
In such a context, the need for international cooperation on
climate and health matters has increased. As UN SecretaryGeneral António Guterres remarked, the scale of the crisis
requires countries to demonstrate solidarity to the most
vulnerable communities and nations. 259 The United States’
leadership, however, has been deaf to such pledges, and
consequently, has been further diminished by the pandemic.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article analyzes the current challenges that climate
change policies face, focusing on the linkages between the
255. Id.
256. Id. (affirming that “unequal access to healthcare, overcrowded
housing and pervasive discrimination make our societies less stable, secure
and prosperous”).
257. Kai Kupferschmidt, ‘Vaccine Nationalism’ Threatens Global Plan to
Distribute COVID-19 Shots Fairly, AAAS (July 28, 2020, 5:50 PM),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/07/vaccine-nationalism-threatensglobal-plan-distribute-covid-19-shots-fairly. COVAX aims at investing in
twelve vaccines and to ensure early access once a vaccine becomes available.
Id. Developed countries will still have incentives for signing up to the COVAX,
as an insurance policy, in case the vaccines they are producing do not
materialize. Id. In this scenario, only 20% of the country’s population would
have access to the vaccine under COVAX. Id.
258. See id.
259. See Press Release, supra note 230.
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climate change policies of the Trump administration and the
COVID-19 pandemic, and on the effects of those linkages both in
the United States and globally. In particular, this Article
addresses the Trump administration’s attacks on climate
science and its deregulatory climate agenda as well as the
United States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. In
addition, it discusses principles of international law and the
challenges related to state liability for environmental harms in
the context of the COVID-19 crisis. This Article also assesses
how the United States’ climate policies are likely to aggravate
inequalities domestically as well as globally in the aftermath of
the pandemic.
Part II focuses on the domestic sphere, analyzing the
climate deregulation measures that will likely have an adverse
impact on the COVID-19 crisis. In addition to discussing attacks
on climate science by the Trump administration, Part II
examines the following proposed deregulatory policies: (i) the
direction given to agencies to neglect GHG emissions and the
related grant of a license that authorizes construction of
pipelines as well as undue delay of regulation issuance, (ii) the
repeal of the Clean Air Act, (iii) the repeal of the Clean Power
Plan and related threats to air quality, (iv) the flexibilization of
the National Environmental Policy Act, (v) the rollback of
regulations promoting fuel efficiency, and (vi) the flexibilization
of regulatory standards and overall enforcement during the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Part II finds that such major deregulatory climate policies
proposed by the Trump administration on climate matters
reiteratively use flawed scientific evidence and temper with costbenefit analysis. Hence, these deregulatory climate measures
disregard the best available science, including the social cost of
carbon, despite the administration being required to consider
both. To put these deregulatory measures in perspective: the
total effect of all the rollbacks pursued by the Trump
administration may well surpass the number of deaths caused
by the COVID-19 virus. Therefore, such climate policies do not
maximize wellbeing. Further, they will have a devastating
economic impact due to the disregard of valid cost considerations
related to the preservation of health and life, to the
environment, and to the climate as a whole.
Part III analyzes a major deregulatory action that will
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negatively impact the pandemic: the withdrawal of the United
States from the Paris Agreement. It concludes that the United
States’ reputation and leadership have been jeopardized by the
climate policies of the Trump administration. These policies,
while assuming free riding, are actually increasing emissions
domestically and beyond. This is against the maximization of
overall wellbeing in the United States as well as globally
because, in economics, improving environmental quality is often
connected to increasing marginal costs, which in practice means
that the first steps are also the most cost-effective. It is
noteworthy that law and economic theorists have contended that
increased environmental performance (favored by stronger
environmental regulations) leads to increased competitiveness
among nations and industries—the Porter hypothesis.
Therefore, the more a country considers the protection of health
and the environment, the more wellbeing maximization occurs.
This, however, is not the case in the United States, as the
climate change policies of the Trump administration are stirred
in the opposite direction.
Part III also examines principles of international law and
the challenges related to state liability for environmental harms
in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. It finds that the United
States’ withdrawal from the Paris Agreement violates general
principles of international law, including the principle of nonregression, which disallows backtracking on environmental
protections. As for climate liability, Part III finds that the
primary rule of the Trail Smelter arbitration case remains
pertinent. Nonetheless, state liability for international harms
caused by climate change is rare, as causation and apportion are
major hurdles to enforcement. That said, caution is highly
recommended. President Trump’s choice to withdraw from the
Paris Agreement mirrors in the international sphere his
domestic policy of supporting fossil fuels. These policies are
consistently denigrating the United States’ international
reputation and undermining its leadership while increasing
GHG emissions and global pollution. These consequences
negatively impact the environment and public health of both the
United States and the global community, aggravating the
adverse impact of the pandemic. Accordingly, the consequences
could not be more severe.
In such a context, Part IV discusses how the United States’
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climate policies are likely to aggravate inequalities, both
domestic and global, in the aftermath of the pandemic. It
examines how these inequalities are similar and highlighted
that those who are bearing the major consequences of COVID19 have already been facing the adverse impacts of climate
change. It found that regulatory action should be based on
prioritarianism and social resilience on the domestic front. In
the international sphere, cooperation among countries remains
a requirement for effective international policies on climate
change and response to the pandemic. As the UN SecretaryGeneral has recently remarked:
The recovery from the COVID-19 crisis must lead
to a different economy. Everything we do during
and after this crisis must be with a strong focus
on building more equal, inclusive and sustainable
economies and societies that are more resilient in
the face of pandemics, climate change and the
many other global challenges we face. 260
In light of all the arguments considered above, this Article
concludes that President Trump’s climate policies are not
maximizing the wellbeing of the U.S. population and have
exacerbated the impact of the pandemic domestically as well as
globally. Accordingly, the United States needs an approach to
climate change policies that is coherent on both the national and
global stages. Ultimately, these policies need to reconcile the
maximization of wellbeing and equity, leading to a paradigmatic
change: instead of the poisoning of the commons, the country will
be part of the cure.

260. Id.
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APPENDIX: FIGURES
FIGURE 1: TABLE CONCERNING THE CARBON DIOXIDE PRODUCED
PER TYPE OF FUEL 261
Fuel Type
Coal (anthracite)
Coal (bituminous)
Coal (lignite)
Coal (subbituminous)
Diesel fuel and heating oil
Gasoline (without ethanol)
Propane
Natural Gas

Pounds of CO2 emitted
(per million BTU)
228.6
205.7
215.4
214.3
161.3
157.2
139.0
117.0

261. Figure 1 was built by the author according to information available
at: Frequently Asked Questions: How Much Carbon Dioxide Is Produced When
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
Different
Fuels
Are
Burned?,
U.S.
https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=73&t=11 (last reviewed Mar. 6,
2021).
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FIGURE 2: PERCENTAGE OF COVID-19 HOSPITALIZATION RATE IN
THE UNITED STATES 262

262. Figure 2 is based on the CDC and state data compiled by Larsen et
al., supra note 247 (noting that the CDC does not report COVID death rates
for American Indians/Alaska Natives independently, state data suggests they
are considerably higher than the country’s average, particularly in the
Southwest).
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